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HELLENIC CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE

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To
The Memory
OF
HENRY AUGUSTUS SILL
AND
GEORGE WILLIS BOTSFORD

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PREFACE

ANCIENT HELLAS was a land of small city-states, each with its own political systems, its own economic interests, its own social customs, and often its own dialect. The highest aim of the citizen was to possess that patriotism which subordinated all to the service of the state, which used every talent for its glorification and which handed down the fatherland greater and better than it had been handed down to him. Out of such ideals came that keen rivalry which produced the finest works of Hellenic culture. But from it also came devastating wars and the downfall of its very products, Hellenic freedom and civilization.

In the early period of Greek history wars were of frequent, almost annual, occurrence; and warfare became a natural part of the citizen's existence with careful rules and regulations—almost a sport. The great Persian war in the first half of the fifth century B. C., however, brought home to the Greeks most clearly the advantages and the disadvantages of war. With the wars between Athens and Sparta and the long and wearisome series of struggles for supremacy which followed in the fourth century, there came a realization of the ruinous effects of strife, which led in turn to the growth of a strong peace movement and to a variety of attempts to solve the problem of inter-Hellenic relations. The development of a desire for peace, with an appreciation of its benefits, along with suggestions for its perpetuation, found expression in the productions of the writers of Hellas. In the history of their age lay the background on which their ideas were founded and the methods which were developed to carry them into execution.

Much has been done in the study of the international law and practice of the Greeks from the institutional point of view. For this the reader is referred to Phillipson, *International Law and Customs of Ancient Greece and Rome* (London, 1911); Raeder, *L'Arbitrage International chez les Hellènes* (New York, 1912); Tod, *Greek International Arbitration* (Oxford, 1913). On their conclusions that part of this study which deals with those topics is based. The purpose of this work, however, is to study rather the ideas than the institutions of the Greeks and to examine the results of their efforts to secure peace among themselves. For this it is necessary to review the historical background and to examine the attitude of the writers toward the general topic of war and peace. This study terminates with the end of the classic period. Consideration of the conceptions of peace in the Hellenistic Age is reserved for a future study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|-------------------|------|
| PREFACE | 5 |

CHAPTER I

THE EPIC AGE

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. Minoan Civilization | 9 |
| 2. The Mycenaean Period. | 11 |
| 3. The Invasions | 14 |
| 4. The World of Homer | 15 |
| 5. The Homeric Attitude toward Peace and War. | 20 |
| 6. Peace and War in the Epic Cycle. | 35 |
| 7. The Views of Hesiod. | 36 |

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE CITY-STATE

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. The Growth of the City-state | 38 |
| 2. Causes of Disunion. | 38 |
| 3. Elements of Union. | 39 |
| 4. Life and Literature in the Asiatic Cities. | 51 |
| 5. The Asiatic Cities at War with Lydia and Persia | 57 |
| 6. Cultural Conditions in Sparta | 59 |
| 7. The Significance of Theognis of Megara | 62 |
| 8. The Development of Athens | 63 |
| 9. The Greeks of Sicily and Italy | 65 |

CHAPTER III

I. THE PERSIAN WARS AND HELLENIC PEACE

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Historical Survey of the Period 490-461 B. C. | 67 |
| 2. Peace and War in Literature | 70 |
| a. Aeschylus | 71 |
| b. Bacchylides | 76 |
| c. Pindar. | 77 |
| d. Heraclitus | 79 |

II. THE AGE OF PERICLES

PAGE

- | | |
|--|----|
| 1. Athens and Sparta, 461-431 B. C | 80 |
| 2. The Attitude of Sophocles | 84 |
| 3. The Views of Herodotus | 85 |

CHAPTER IV

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. The Causes of the War and the Failure of Arbitration | 87 |
| 2. The Events of the War and their Effects | 91 |
| 3. Aristophanes and the Peace Party | 99 |
| 4. Thucydides and the War | 100 |
| 5. The Attitude of Euripides. | 103 |

CHAPTER V

THE FOURTH CENTURY

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Wars and Peace, 404-338 B. C | 108 |
| 2. War and Peace in Fourth-Century Literature | 125 |
| a. Xenophon | 125 |
| b. Demosthenes | 127 |
| c. Socrates | 127 |
| d. Plato | 127 |
| e. Aristotle. | 130 |
| f. Isocrates. | 131 |
| 3. Conclusion. | 138 |

CHAPTER I

THE EPIC AGE

THE earliest expression of thought known to us from the ancient Hellenes is to be found in the epic poets of the Middle Age: Homer, the writers of the *Epic Cycle*, and Hesiod. Many diverse elements, however, go to make up the ideas and pictures of the poems, the traditions of earlier days, the character of the incoming northerner, the society in which the poets lived, and above all the depth of their understanding of life and its emotions. One may single out material things and claim from archæological evidence that they belonged to earlier days; one may place political and social institutions in the time of the poets with some security. It is a much more difficult, in many respects an impossible, task to treat the expression of ideas in this fashion. One may only endeavor to point out something of that which preceded the poets and venture to draw conclusions with reserve.

Far in the background of the poems lay the civilization known as the Ægean, and divided usually into the Minoan and Mycenean periods. The Ægean basin was inhabited from neolithic times, probably by members of the Mediterranean race. With the introduction of bronze, civilization developed among them rapidly until it reached its culmination in the splendor of the Minoan Age, the center of which was the city of Cnossus on the island of Crete, where Minos traditionally held sway and whence he extended his conquests and spread his culture. Legend records that he was the first to drive pirates from the sea and to establish peace

pushed down into Thessaly on the one side, and entered Thrace and crossed the Hellespont into the Troad and Phrygia on the other. In the course of the first half of the second millennium they penetrated farther south into Greece, blending doubtless with the earlier inhabitants whom they found there. Among these people Minoan culture began to develop afresh. The gradual nature of the infiltration and the blending of the peoples facilitated the process. Thessaly, in a continuous turmoil from fresh invasions, and backward in civilization, acted as a buffer, and protected and made possible the southern development.¹

At strategic points which controlled trade routes or in fertile valleys were built the fortress cities of the new-comer, possibly under Minoan control, as the Attic legend indicates, but surely under Minoan influence. The plain of Messene, the valley of the Eurotas, the Argive plain with its roads to the isthmus, the isthmus of Corinth itself, the valleys of Attica and the fertile land of Boeotia were the centers of these new people. Possibly some of the cities were earlier Minoan foundations into which the invader came through invitation to aid in defense or through marriage into the ruling family. In any case commerce with Crete, and doubtless also the presence of Minoan artist and architect, brought the influence of the older civilization strongly to bear and produced the legendary Heroic Age of Greece. The northerner took over the material civilization of the southerner, his pictures, furniture, jewelry, and personal adornments, his gold and silver work, but preserved his own northern type of dwelling with its central hearth. Necessity here compelled the erection of huge fortresses, and there arose the mighty walls and elaborate defenses so

¹ For the invasions cf. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (2nd ed. Strassburg, 1912), vol. i, pp. 67, *et seq.* On the condition of Thessaly, cf. Wace and Thompson, *Prehistoric Thessaly* (Cambridge, 1912).

familiar at Mycenae and Tiryns. War was a natural part of life, and hence played a larger part in art than among the Cretans. Warriors and the siege of cities appear on vases, and the shield symbol of the war god was a favorite mural decoration. The warrior adopted Minoan methods of warfare, the chariot and the huge shield, and to his own barbaric character he added the refinements of Minoan brutality. The use of the poisoned arrow, the heartless treatment of the conquered foe, the maltreatment of the enemy's corpse, the human sacrifice to appease the dead, are features which are characteristic of most peoples in the stage of civilization known as the Heroic Age.¹

With new conditions all ties of kindred and tribe were broken and strong monarchies were developed. Bound by bonds of equal rank and common military necessity, royal families kept closely in touch with one another. Visits were frequent between them, and marriages bound them together. Traditions recorded these things and indicated that the ruler of Mycenae was overlord of all, strong enough to call on all for their services and to obtain them. A more general feeling of unity and good-will appears to have prevailed then than at any later period in the history of Hellas, the indications of which appear in the later legends of the Trojan and Theban wars. Under such conditions of life there developed the art of epic poetry, when court poets recited the glorious deeds of the warriors and the splendors of life in the court.²

¹ Cf. Chadwick, H. M., *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge, 1912), p. 462.

² This description of the Heroic Age is based in general on Chadwick, *op. cit.*, and on Leaf, *Homer and History* (London, 1915). On the Mycenaean origins of the epics cf. Evans, A. J., "The Minoan and Mycenaean Elements in Hellenic Life" in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 32 (1912); Meillet, *Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque* (Paris, 1913), pp. 193-4.

With strength came expansion. Marauding bands occupied the islands of the Ægean. The Cretans, excluded from those waters, turned to other regions and appeared in Spain, in Sicily, in Cyprus and in Palestine. Internal disease of convention and caste had prepared the way, and when plunderers brought catastrophe the end was swift. Minos became a name and the power of Cnossus a tradition embodied in the court poetry to be handed down to future ages. The pirates reached even to the shores of the Nile delta in their wanderings, while on the north a wealthy settlement on the hill of Hissarlik in the Troad was destroyed. Egyptian inscriptions record that the isles of the sea were in confusion.

In the twelfth century new elements appeared in fresh invasions from the northwest. The old cities on the mainland fell a prey to the invader and the older settlers were pushed out to seek homes beyond the sea. Save in mountainous Arcadia and barren Attica, all was confusion. The people were migratory, either looking for better lands for themselves or pushed out by new tribes seeking their lands. Maintenance was all they sought from the soil. Fortifications were either unnecessary or impossible. The tribes were war-loving and sought subsistence rather by plunder than by work. Robbery on land and piracy by sea were freely practised, and regarded as no disgrace. All men went armed and were quick to resent the least slight with combat.¹ Thucydides' description of the early days of Hellas has been accepted as a picture of the conditions which put an end to Mycenaean culture and plunged Greece into its Middle Age. Early and late comers mingled and pushed on. Crete became a land of many cities and men, with confusion of tongues. Cyprus received a colony of the earlier peoples. The islands of the Ægean were popu-

¹ *Thucydides*, i, 1, 2.

lated, old foundations on the Anatolian coast were increased in size and new ones were founded. In general the movements took parallel lines, the Thessalians occupying the northern islands and the region called Æolis, the Ionians, the central position, with the Dorians to the south. A large amount of fusion followed, both among themselves and with the old inhabitants of their new homes.

As the movements gradually died down and times of comparative peace returned, civilization began to build afresh. In the south where the centers of Mycenaean or Minoan influence had been, culture appeared first in a nucleus of Minoan ideas, while to the north the civilization of the newcomer was predominant. One thing all treasured in common—the epic poetry which told of the traditions of former glory. These, reflecting sometimes the language, more often the material customs and glories of Mycenaean courts, were sung by bards throughout the new settlements on the mainland of Greece and in Æolis and Ionia alike. In the old songs the bards found their material, and into that material as warp they wove the ideas and customs of their own times and conditions.

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the products of the greatest of these bards. Homer took the old Achæan songs and traditions and with the fire of his genius forged them afresh into the finest of epic poems.¹ The traditional stories contained many things foreign to the spirit of the poet. In them the poisoned arrow was deadly, the slaughter

¹ The Homeric question has been a subject so widely discussed and with such varying views that the writer has felt it best to adhere to the opinion upheld by Botsford in his *Hellenic History* (in manuscript) without entering into a discussion of the question. In accordance with that opinion the changes in the matter and spirit of the tradition noted by Gilbert Murray in his *Rise of the Greek Epic* (2nd ed. Oxford, 1911), have been treated as a part of Homer's work in his handling of the old stories.

of foemen knew no mercy. The dead was despoiled of his armor, his head placed upon the stakes of the wall and his body defiled and left as a prey to the dogs and vultures. When a city was captured it was wasted by fire, the warriors were slain in the presence of their wives, and their bodies left to be torn to pieces by the very dogs they had raised; while the women were driven with blows from the corpses of their husbands and led into a far-off land as slaves, and "in Argos ply another's loom and bring water of Messeis or Hypereia, though unwilling stern compulsion presses on."¹ The infant children not worth carrying off were dashed to the ground and not even the man-child in the mother's womb was spared.² At the bier of the fallen hero captured warriors were slain as a sacrifice to appease the dead. The gods, too, demanded human sacrifice and purificatory rites for blood guilt.³

The strength of tradition prevented the omission of many of these things, though they were contrary to the spirit of the poet. So many as he could, he omitted; others he excused or palliated on other grounds. He declared that the gods themselves forbade the use of deadly drugs on arrows.⁴ In his treatment of the stories, the captured were not slain, except in the heat of fiercest battle, but held for ransom.⁵ The suppliant, though he were one's dearest enemy, was always spared, for Zeus was his protector.⁶ Despoliation and defilement were often threatened but, save for the taking of armor, never performed. The word which meant defile-

¹ *Il.* vi, 456-8.

² *Il.* vi, 410-465; xvii, 125-7, 238-45; xviii, 176-7, 334-5; xix, 291-4; xxii, 59-76; ix, 590-4; vi, 55-60; xxiv, 730-1; *Od.* viii, 522 *et seq.*

³ *Vide infra*, p. 35.

⁴ *Od.* i, 260-3.

⁵ *Il.* ii, 229-30; xi, 131-5, 104-106.

⁶ *Il.* xxiv, 185-7.

ment was changed to mean decent covering.¹ In addition, truces were arranged to provide for the burial of the dead.² The maltreatment of Hector's corpse, a grievous deed in the mind of the poet, was excused because of the excessive grief of Achilles. Nay more, the gods intervened to preserve the body unharmed and to save him from a terrible sin.³ The gods forbade loud thanksgiving over slaughtered men. The fate of conquered and captured is predicted, feared, and made a subject for lamentation in general, though the lot of Briseis was certainly not entirely unhappy. The stories of human sacrifice and purificatory rites were omitted, and the slaughter of the twelve noble youths at the funeral pyre of Patroclus was laid rather to grief and wrath than to any desire to appease the dead.⁴

The stage of society which Homer represents was natural to an age which had seen the end of wanderings and the first suggestions of settled life. Cities, governments and customs were just beginning to assume stable forms. The days of the mighty warriors of the epic when men were greater and stronger and more warlike "than men are now," were past. Between the tribes there still existed a relationship of neither war nor peace. Communities and individuals preyed on each other or kept peace as necessity or greed dictated, without formalities of declarations or treaties. Piracy was a recognized profession grouped with legitimate trade and adventure and carried no disgrace. Raiding parties seized the cattle on the hillsides and sold the herdsman into slavery, or wasted the harvest and carried off the oxen and the horses. The only recourse for the injured,

¹ Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 147.

² *Il.* vii, 375-8.

³ *Il.* xxiii, 24 *et seq.*; xxiv, 15-21.

⁴ On the subject of these changes *cf.* Murray, *op. cit.*, ch. v. As will be seen, they are thoroughly in consonance with the spirit of the poem.

whether tribe or individual, was retaliation and open warfare.¹ Personal or family quarrels between princes led to strife between tribes.² The poet considered the violation of hospitality and the invasion of the family circle in the theft of Helen a cause entirely sufficient for the ten years' war and the destruction of Troy. But back of it he saw the final cause in the guiding power of Zeus, swaying the destiny of nations. Helen was but a pawn in his hands for the destruction of Troy. He was the final arbiter and "hath brought down the head of many cities."³

Yet the seeds of future interstate law existed and played their part in the alleviation of strife. The privilege of embassy was considered inviolate under the protection of Zeus, as when Menelaus and Odysseus visited Troy in their vain effort to avoid the war. The act of those Trojans who proposed in the assembly that they be slain forthwith was held to be a foul shame.⁴ Truces were frequently made, surrounded with religious ceremonies, and their binding force was recognized, that the dead might be buried, that Hector might address the warriors, or that champions might fight to decide the issue and save the host from further grievous strife. The violation of the truce was considered a craven and irreligious act and brought renewal of the combat.⁵ The institution of guest-friendship existed and formed a bond sufficient to cause foemen to spare each other in the fight and to reconcile them.⁶ The respect which the strong and generous man felt for a worthy foeman led to brief reconciliation and exchange of gifts. Later they might re-

¹ *Il.* i, 152-6; *Od.* iii, 103-6; ix, 252; *Il.* i, 124, 5; xxiii, 341, 2; xi, 104-6.

² Chadwick, *Heroic Age*, pp. 331, *et seq.*

³ *Il.* ii, 117, 177, 8; iii, 164, 5; ix, 337-41; ii, 38-40.

⁴ *Il.* xi, 138-42.

⁵ *Il.* iii, 250-311; vii, 375-8; iv, 86-222; iv, 220-239; ix, 338-41.

⁶ *Il.* vi, 215-31; *Od.* xv, 196, 7.

new the fight, but for the time men might say, "these twain fought for the sake of strife that tears the heart, then in friendship joined together they parted."¹ Age with honor received its due respect and gained for Eëtion all the honors of a warrior's burial from Achilles when high-gated Thebes was sacked.² Between the deadliest enemies only was this of no avail. Hector offered it but Achilles refused, for friendship was impossible, nor could any agreement be made until one or the other fell.³

Warfare in the Homeric Age was a personal or tribal matter. The poet represents the warrior of his day as fighting to protect his parents, wives and children, to defend the safety of his allies or to gain honor for his chief.⁴ He suffered toil cheerfully that he might obtain booty and wealth for himself. Preëminence might be gained by oratory in the council; indeed many of the most renowned fighters were distinguished for their ability in that respect, but that served only to accentuate their preëminence in the fight.⁵ Lands and dominions obligated men to stand in the first rank and prove their merit in the combat.⁶ The highest prize of all was the personal glory which war as *kydaneira*, the giver of glory to men, might secure for the warrior. His prowess in the combat was his proudest boast. That his glory might be celebrated everywhere and for all time was the summit of his ambition.⁷ For this he gave up all the pleasures of life, suffered all manner of hardships, courted

¹ *Il.* vii, 288-302.

² *Il.* vi, 416-420.

³ *Il.* xxii, 261-272, a characteristic feature of heroic poetry, cf. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

⁴ *Il.* viii, 55-57; xvii, 156-8, 220-8; i, 148-168; xiii, 266-71; xx, 661-6; xvi, 270 *et seq.*

⁵ *Il.* i, 490; ii, 202; iii, 204 *et seq.*; xiii, 260, *et seq.*; i, 124, 5; xi, 407-410.

⁶ *Il.* xii, 310-28.

⁷ Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

death in his youth, even chose death that his fame might live through the ages.

War, therefore, is, in the mind of the poet, the chief business of men from youth to age.¹ But he regards it as the especial flower of youth. The valor wherein is highest power, the reckless courage of the young man, fosterling of Zeus, sweeps him on without the caution of age and secures for him distinction. If he falls torn by the sharp spear in the field of honorable battle, his fame is sure and it is a seemly sight to his comrades.²

The reaction of the battle on the warrior soul, Homer knows well and stirringly describes. The very sight of steel is enough to stir up the martial spirit in the hero's breast.³ When the stubborn fight draws near, the man of war becomes hardy and war is dear to him. He yearns for it and prays to mingle in the dread combat.⁴ Then pre-eminence gained by words in the council is of no avail. The time for words has ended and the councillor finds glory in the contest.⁵ To express the spirit that grips the warrior's soul in the charge, Homer used a special word *Charme*, joy in battle.⁶ Gods and men alike were possessed by it in the *mêlée* of the contest. It brought lust for battle and made men fight unwearied and unwearying.⁷ Under its influence they were insatiate of the combat and thought war far sweeter than dear native land.⁸ When the favorable omen,

¹ *Il.* vi, 492, 3; xiv, 84-89.

² *Il.* vi, 492; iii, 108-110; ix, 39; xiii, 484; xiv, 85, 6; xvi, 626-31; xxii, 59-76.

³ *Od.* xvi, 294.

⁴ *Il.* ii, 473; iv, 225; xiii, 270-1; xv, 486-8; xvi, 492-4.

⁵ *Il.* xvi, 627-31.

⁶ *Il.* v, 608, *et al.*

⁷ *Il.* xv, 696-8.

⁸ *Il.* ii, 451-4; xi, 3-14; xiii, 636-9.

the bird of Zeus, brought the fervor of success, it was the war god Ares himself who entered into men and gave them untold powers.¹ Poseidon strengthened the Ajantes and filled them with the will for strife even with mighty Hector:

And of the twain Oileus' son, the swift-footed Ajax, was the first to know the god and instantly he spake to Ajax, son of Telamon. ". . . For lo! the courage within my own breast is roused up the more for war and battle while my feet below and my hands above quiver with eagerness." Then, answering him, spake Telamonian Ajax. "So even now my hands invincible lust for the spear-handle, and my spirit is arisen and my feet speed beneath me. So do I yearn to fight the rage unceasing even of Hector, son of Priam."²

But the poet understands the effects of disaster on the morale of the fighter. *Charme* is not a constant thing. The pain of a wound causes it to disappear.³ When the tide of battle turns and defeat impends and the death-dealing arrows pour in thickly, all memory of the joy of battle is lost and the fighters think longingly of home and family and peace.⁴

Death is no dishonorable thing, Homer feels, when by this means family and home are saved.⁵ Far more is cowardice that flees the fight disgraceful; it is the most venomous charge that can be made against a warrior.⁶ Craven Paris is but a sorry figure beside glorious Hector.⁷ The man who flees the combat is fit only for death.⁸ The cowards were driven into the center of the ranks whence there

¹ *Il.* viii, 251-2; xv, 379-80.

² *Il.* xiii, 73-80. Quotations from the *Iliad* are based upon the translation by Lang, Leaf and Myers (London, 1917).

³ *Il.* xii, 389-94; xvii, 602.

⁴ *Il.* xiii, 620-39; xiii, 721.

⁵ *Il.* xv, 494-9.

⁷ *Il.* iii, 38, *et seq.*

⁶ *Il.* i, 225-8.

⁸ *Il.* xii, 241-50.

was no escape and thus compelled to fight.¹ This made fear of shame in the eyes of comrades and of the women, the greatest spur to the warrior's soul.² Men are summoned not to the dancing floor but to the battlefield, and there all fear and weakness must be laid aside and with eagerness and strength the battle joined at risk of life or death.³ "Friends," said Atreides, "be men and brave of heart. Fear the shame of others in the stubborn fight. Of men fleeing from shame, more survive in safety than are slain, but for those that flee the fight there arises neither fame nor safety."⁴ So spoke the chieftain and men knew it to be just. Yet they felt the bitterness that justice did not always prevail. "Equal lot falleth to him that remaineth and to him that goeth forth to fight; in the same honor are held the evil and the good; both must die, the toilless man and the hero of many deeds."⁵

The glorification of war, the gleam and glory of battle, were the subjects of the finest word-pictures the master of poets could paint. He describes the hosts as they move into battle, as the west wind which the goatherd sees as it blows across the sea and gradually becomes the great whirlwind that drives the flocks scurrying to the cave.⁶ The Trojans with their clamor and shouting seem to him like the cranes that come to the ocean fleeing the cold of winter,⁷ as countless as the leaves and flowers of spring or as the flies that hover about the milkman's pails when the milk has been poured from them, or the feathered birds, wild geese or cranes or long-necked swans flying by the river Caystrus on the Asian plain, and crying as they fly, rejoicing in their plumage. The dazzling gleam of their bronze is like a rav-

¹ *Il.* iv, 293-309.

² *Il.* xv, 502-13.

³ *Il.* ix, 318-32.

⁴ *Il.* iii, 1-9.

⁵ *Il.* vi, 441-4.

⁶ *Il.* v, 528-32; xv, 561-4.

⁷ *Il.* iv, 273-82; cf. xv, 379-389.

aging fire in a boundless forest on a mountain-top.¹ The finest picture of all is that of the Greek host in the thirteenth book.

Spear on spear made close-set fence, and shield on serried shield, buckler pressed on buckler, and helm on helm, and man on man. The horsehair crests on the bright helmet ridges touched each other as they nodded, so close they stood each by other, and spears brandished by bold hands were interlaced and their hearts were steadfast and lusted for battle.²

In the stress of battle itself, Homer sees a fire that leaps upon a city of men and roars out with the wind, or a cloud of dust which the wind stirs up on a day when the dust lies thickest on the roads.³

To the scenes and details of the battle the poet devotes his highest art, and the modern reader still must thrill at the tales of combat as did the listeners of ancient days. But the genius of Homer is greater than that. Beneath the glitter and the gleam he penetrates to the darker side, the exhaustion of men and beasts, the mind-shaking confusion, the darts, the dust, the shattered arms, the groans of the fallen and the black blood.⁴

The baldrick of the shield man-sheltering shall become wet on the breast and hand shall become weary round the spear, and the horse as he draws the well-polished chariot shall be drenched with sweat, for the coming of night only shall separate the warriors.⁵

In the battle-fever he sees Ares, bane of mortals, and his

¹ *Il.* i, 455-73; iv, 273-282; xvii, 735-41.

² *Il.* xiii, 125-35; cf. xvi, 165 *et seq.*

³ *Il.* xvii, 735-41; xiii, 333-44.

⁴ *Il.* iv, 446-51; x, 297-8; xi, 163-4; xi, 53-55.

⁵ *Il.* ii, 386-90.

dear son Panic, that terrifies even the hardy warrior, and Terror and Rout and Strife, Eris whose fury wearieth not, own sister and mistress of murderous Ares, who drags the wounded and the dead through the *mêlée*, her cloak red with the blood of men. It was she who first cast discord among men. From small beginnings she causes strife to arise. At first she rears her crest but little, and then her head towers towards heaven and she walks upon the earth.¹ Men fall in battle as the thickets of trees before the fire when the wind rages or as the grain in the rich man's field before the reapers.² Not even Ares nor Athena may despise the sight, and Eris alone is glad; while of men, the poet declares, only the hard of heart may not sorrow at the sight.³ This is the final hazard of war and each man prays to one of the immortal gods for escape from death and the *mêlée* of Ares.⁴

A great many adjectives are used in the poems for vividness in the description of war, furious and stubborn, keen and raging, incessant and mighty in its dread battle-cry, but always a bringer of glory to men. On the other hand, Ares is called the sacker of cities, insatiate of war, reckless and ruthless, all destructive, a blood-stained bane to mortals, man-slaying and glutted with blood, evil, loathsome, ill-sounding, toilsome, grievous, sad and full of tears, murderous and bringing a pitiable sleep, epithets which show the other side of the combat.

That war brings hardship and toil as well as glory, Homer knows full well.⁵ He shows how the warrior must stay for long periods away from wife and child, and must refrain

¹ *Il.* iv, 439-45; xviii, 535-8; xiii, 298-300.

² *Il.* xi, 67-74, 150-162.

³ *Il.* xi, 73-4; xiii, 343-4; iv, 539-44; xvii, 360-5.

⁴ *Il.* ii, 400-1.

⁵ *Od.* iii, 100.

from honey-hearted wine lest he be crippled of his courage and forgetful of his might.¹ He sets forth the uncertainty of war. Ares rageth confusedly and men live or die as fate decrees.² The war god has no favorites and he that would kill is killed.³ Then many a noble young man falls into darkness; all his accomplishments are of no avail and the soul, leaving manhood and youth, departs wailing to Hades' realm, that most wretched of all lands.⁴ The body is left far from loving hands for the birds that eat raw flesh to shroud it with their wings.⁵ The living may mourn but for a day, for the foeman ever presses on.⁶ Such burdens and fears would be enough to make a man depart disheartened were it not a shame to wait so long and go away empty.⁷ In the end, however, the glorious rewards of praise and booty make it all worth while in the eyes of the warrior.⁸

But there is still another side of the picture. Parents, wives and children and the possessions which the needy covet are left at home. The return of the absent one brings joy, but his death, grief unspeakable. Nor ever do his children prattle on his knees when he comes back from war and the dread combat.⁹ The aged father whose sons have fallen, never repaid for their nurture, is broken with sorrow, and kinsmen divide his property. Or if sons remain at home, they are the shameful ones, false-tongued, light-

¹ *Il.* ii, 134-7, 291-8; vi, 264-5.

² *Od.* xi, 534, 5; *Il.* xi, 407-410.

³ *Il.* xviii, 309.

⁴ *Il.* v, 47, 68, 82 *et seq.*; xi, 161 *et seq.*; xvi, 856-7; *Od.* xi, 488 *et seq.*; xi, 241-3, 262, 3.

⁵ *Il.* xi, 391-5, 450-4.

⁶ *Il.* xix, 225-33.

⁷ *Il.* ii, 291-8.

⁸ *Il.* ii, 354-6; xiii, 266-71; xiv, 84-9.

⁹ *Il.* v, 407-9, 479-81; ii, 699-702; v, 687-8; xvii, 34-37.

hearted heroes of the dance.¹ But the doom of the captive woman who sees husband, brothers, father, warrior son and all, slain, her infant son hurled from the walls, and then in captivity suffers the vengeance of the conqueror, is the hardest lot of all.² The lament of Andromache is one of the finest touches of deep human feeling in all literature.³

While the poet, deep in his understanding of human nature and true to life, presents both sides of war, he often uses the evil to make more vivid the glorious by contrast. His own attitude and the true sentiment of the poems may be found in his treatment of the two great figures of the *Iliad*, Hector and Achilles. They call forth his most expressive language, arouse him to the highest pitch of poetic achievement and present in their careers the noblest ideals of his age. And the warrior's life was their choice and pride. "For war is the task of all men, but most of all for me, among those who dwell in Ilium," was Hector's proud boast.⁴ Bravery in the forefront of the Trojans was the lesson he had learned in the battles he had fought for his father's glory and his own.⁵ The highest aspiration of the chieftain for his son, one of the most genuine expressions of the poem, is to be found in his prayer for Astyanax:

Zeus and ye other gods, grant me this I pray. May this, my son, become even as I, most splendid of the Trojans and of as mighty power, and may he rule valiantly in Ilium. And then may some one say, better far is he than his father; and as he comes from war and brings the bloody arms when he has slain the foeman, then may his mother rejoice in her heart.⁶

¹ *Il.* v, 23-4; vi, 127; v, 152-8; xiv, 501-5; xvii, 301-2; xxiv, 253-62.

² *Il.* ii, 354-6; vi, 410-65; ix, 590-4; xix, 292-4; *Od.* viii, 522 *et seq.*

³ *Il.* xxii, 477-515.

⁴ *Il.* vi, 492-3.

⁵ *Il.* vi, 440-65.

⁶ *Il.* vi, 476-81.

Ability, courage, booty, fame, what else is there to wish for!

The choice of Achilles, a short life and glory everlasting instead of uneventful old age, is the keynote of the *Iliad*. Until his quarrel with Agamemnon he ever bore the brunt of war and was the leader of the Greeks in their plundering raids. Twelve cities of men he sacked from shipboard, and from land eleven.¹ After the quarrel, when angry pride kept him from the combat, he was consumed with longing.² Then when fired with wrath at the death of Patroclus, he became invincible. The plain was covered and the river choked with the bodies of men he had slain. He refused all ransoms, rejected every covenant and was ready to fight with the river god himself.³

All the poet's magic is employed in the description of these heroes as they fight. Hector is a storm-cloud of war, like unto a fleet wave or a ravening lion, or destructive fire on the hills.⁴ "Foam came about his mouth and his eyes gleamed under his grim brows, and terribly the helmet shook above the temples of Hector as he fought, for Zeus himself from heaven was his ally."⁵ When Achilles fought on the plain,

as through deep glens rageth fierce fire on some parched mountain side and the deep forest burneth and the wind driving it whirlleth every way the flame, so ragéd he every way with his spear, as it had been a god, pressing hard on the men he slew and the black earth ran with blood. Even as when one yoketh wide-browed bulls to tread white barley in a 'stablished threshing floor and quickly it is trodden out beneath the feet of the loud-lowing bulls, thus beneath the great-hearted Achilles, his whole-hooved horses trampled corpses and shields to-

¹ *Il.* ix, 338-9; i, 165.

² *Il.* ii, 771-9; i, 490-2.

³ *Il.* xx.

⁴ *Il.* xv, 605-36.

⁵ *Il.* xv, 606-11.

gether, and with blood the axle-tree below was sprinkled and the rims that ran round the car, for blood drops from the horses' hooves splashed them and blood drops from the tires of the wheels. But the son of Peleus pressed on to win him glory everlasting, flecking with gore his irresistible hands.¹

The horror of the sight but adds to the marvel of the mighty man of arms.

Glory everlasting was the hero's aim. Hector bowed to the will of destiny in death, but prayed that he might not die without a struggle but in some deeds of arms whereof men yet unborn might hear.² For this it was that Achilles gave up all else that men hold dear. When it had been attained he was willing to accept death whenever the immortal gods were minded to accomplish it.³

As these men are the subjects of the poet's greatest joy, so is it fitting that they be likewise the subjects of his greatest grief. The lament over the death of Hector is one of the most moving of tragic verses. The old man Priam has seen, and must still see, full many ills, of sons perishing and daughters carried away, ere he shall fall a prey to the warrior's sword and be torn to pieces by the dogs he has nurtured.⁴ But this is the greatest sorrow, when Hector falls before Achilles. The gods themselves take pity on him, preserve the body of his son and send him forth under divine guidance to ransom it. The king of mighty Ilium descends to clasp the knees and kiss the hands, terrible man-slaying hands, of Achilles the victorious.

Fear thou the gods, Achilles, and have compassion on me, be-thinking thee of thy father. Lo, I am yet more piteous than he and have braved what none other man on earth hath braved

¹ *Il.* xx, 490-504.

² *Il.* vi, 486-9; xxii, 304-5.

³ *Il.* xxii, 365-6.

⁴ *Il.* xxii, 59-76.

before, to stretch forth my hands towards the face of the slayer of my sons.¹

Achilles, too, has his sorrow. He knows that his own time is approaching. In the midst of his glory he must needs remember: "Yet over me too hang death and forceful fate. There cometh morn or eve or some noon-day when my life too some man shall take in battle."² He thinks of the grief of his aged father in his halls, his heart is melted within him and they weep together the old and the young, the one for his son, the other for his father's sake.³ So Homer portrays the final grief of war.

Even as Homer's heroes, so were Homer's gods. The immortal gods looked down from Olympus upon the war; they were swayed by its passions, and interfered now to rescue some favorite from impending death, now to stir up their chosen side, again to take part in the war and fight against mortals, and finally even to fight against each other, a foolish thing for gods to fight for the sake of pitiful mortals, the most miserable of creatures.⁴ Then they withdrew to their quiet seats while Discord kept up the war. Ares, the braggart bully, was unpopular because he loved strife and war and battles.⁵ He was the stormer of cities, insatiate of war.⁶ Athena was driver of the spoil for the Greeks and was hailed as the protectress of the city by the Trojans.⁷ Cypris, however, was a coward goddess and not one of those that have mastery in battle of the warriors.⁸ Zeus, the dispenser of war to men, ruled over all and swayed the battle

¹ *Il.* xxiv, 477-9, 503-6.

² *Il.* xxi, 110-2.

³ *Il.* xxiv, 507-12.

⁴ *Il.* xi, 3-14; xxi, 462-7; ii, 451-4; v, 23, 24, 732; xiii, 125-135.

⁵ *Il.* v, 889-91; xi, 3-14; 73-74.

⁶ *Il.* vi, 269.

⁷ *Il.* vi, 297.

⁸ *Il.* v, 330-3.

now one way and now another. It was he who broke the spear of Ajax and the bow of Teucer and made Hector faint-hearted. "Ever is the wit of Zeus stronger than the wit of men, for he driveth valiant men in flight and easily taketh away the victory and then again rouseth men to fight."¹ Apollo killed Patroclus and Athena betrayed Hector to his death.² Truly "the issues lie on the knees of the gods and from on high they guide the threads of victory."³

Above gods and men alike the poet's vision descries Destiny whom none may gainsay or escape, be he coward or be he valiant. The hero warrior will accept its decree of life or death without question and meet it fearlessly and gloriously as did Hector and Achilles, for not even Zeus may turn it aside.⁴ In the contemplation of such a power the poet's heart sinks. "What a pitiable thing is man after all, the most miserable of all creeping things, born unto pain, living like leaves in glowing life consuming the fruit of the earth, then sinking unto death."⁵ In the last analysis there is but one avail. "One omen is best, to fight for native land."⁶

But life is not all war, even in heroic times. The theme and central interest of the *Iliad* is war, yet there appear many peaceful scenes. As well as the *Charme* of battle the poet knows the happiness of peace. On the shield of Achilles beside the city at war there is another at peace, happy with marriages and dances, women standing in the doorways and men contending in the market place; the fresh-

¹ *Il.* xvi, 119-21; xv, 462, 3; xvi, 656, 688-90.

² *Il.* xvi, 787-793; xxii, 214 *et seq.*

³ *Il.* vii, 99; xvii, 514-5.

⁴ *Il.* vi, 486-9; xi, 329-332; xxii, 365-6.

⁵ *Il.* xxvii, 446-7; xxiv, 520-6.

⁶ *Il.* xii, 243.

plowed field, the rich demesne land of a king in reaping time, the vineyard teeming plenteously with clusters, the herd of kine beside the murmuring river, and white sheep and thatched huts and folds.¹

In the midst of the strife when champions appeared and there were prospects of a settlement, the host rejoiced in silence in the dream of relief from the contest.² Even doughty Menelaus in the midst of battle may wish for his fill of love and sleep and of sweet song and dance delectable rather than of war, but only, it must be remarked, when the fight is going against him.³ The man who always loves strife and wars and fighting, Homer considers the most hateful of men, while only a tribeless, lawless, homeless man loves bitter civil strife.⁴

From the store of his knowledge of peaceful conditions and of nature the poet drew many of those similes⁵ which make so vivid and so artistic his scenes of battle, the winds and the clouds, the fleet waves, the birds, the leaves and the flowers in their season, the flies hovering about the herdsman's pails, the wide-browed bulls yoked to tread white barley. When in the midst of a thrilling description of battle he sought to mark the noon-day hour, his mind turned from the battle to the picture of the woodsman in the dells of the mountain resting and making ready his mid-day meal.⁶ The startling transition presents such a contrast of colors as only the daring master may attempt, and the more successful therefore.

In the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, the theme is travel

¹ *Il.* xviii, 467-608.

² *Il.* iii, 111-2.

³ *Il.* xiii, 636-9.

⁴ *Il.* ix, 63-4; i, 176-7.

⁵ It must be noted that many of the similes may belong to the traditional material which Homer used.

⁶ *Il.* xi, 84-90.

and adventure. War and its glorification no longer play a leading rôle. The war is over, yet its spirit still broods over the lines of the poem. It is an ever present memory in the minds of men. The great men of the time were those who had taken part in the war, while Agamemnon's fame was the greatest under heaven.¹ The most welcome news that Odysseus could bring to the shade of Achilles was that Neoptolemus, his son, had distinguished himself in feats of arms.² Odysseus, too, was by no means a peaceful man. Athena chided him that he was too ready to fight, for the deeds of war were ever in his heart.³ The strong man's pride appears especially in the boast of Odysseus when he arrived in Ithaca in disguise:

But then verily did Ares and Athena give me boldness and courage to hurl through the press of men, whensoever I chose the best warriors at an ambush, sowing the seeds of evil for my foes. No fear of death was ever in my lordly heart, but I would leap out on the foremost and slay with the spear whoso of my foes was less fleet of foot than I. Such an one was I in war, but the labor of the field I loved not, nor homekeeping thrift that breeds brave children, but galleys and wars and polished shafts and darts, baneful things whereat others used to shudder.⁴

Thus boasted the warrior home from the wars while the circle round him marveled. But men remembered the pain as well as the glory. Nestor declared that he would willingly sacrifice two-thirds of his riches to have with him safe those brave men who perished of old in the wide land of Troy.⁵

¹ *Od.* ix, 264.

² *Od.* xi, 513⁺-37.

³ *Od.* xii, 116-7.

⁴ *Od.* xix, 216-226, trans. by Butcher and Lang (London, 1917).

⁵ *Od.* iii, 103; iv, 97-99.

The society of the *Odyssey* shows the warlike state of the times. Princes wore their swords. Spears were carried into the assembly and to the dining-hall, where they were stacked. So familiar a feature of the furnishings of the great hall were they that their absence occasioned comment.¹

In dreamy contrast to the tumult and the shouting, the glory and the suffering of the Greeks in the war, the troubled wanderings and sad home-comings of the warriors, the strife at home and the memories of war, Homer drew his picture of those ideal people, the Phaeacians. Far from strife and contention, they enjoyed eternal peace and prosperity, for none should ever be able to bring war against them.² Masts and oars and ships engaged their attention rather than the accoutrements of war. Yet the poet did not regard them as coward weaklings or inglorious, but worthy of all praise. The highest honor among them was to be achieved by hand and foot in the games from which the strife of boxing and wrestling was excluded. "For we are no perfect boxers nor wrestlers, but speedy runners and the best of seamen, and dear to us ever is the banquet and the harp and the dance and changes of raiment and love and sleep."³ If this be the poet's ideal it is in marked contrast to that expressed in Hector's prayer.

Whence came the rejections of the more brutal parts of the old tradition, these peaceful sentiments, this realization of the horrors of war and the joys of peace, those glorious similes of nature in her sunny as well as in her stormy moods, and this ideal dream of a people at peace? Some may be due to the northern background of the poet. The treatment of religion seems almost certainly the result of this: the gods are of the heavens and dwell on the

¹ *Od.* i, 99; ii, 10; xix, 5 *et seq.*, xxii, 74.

² *Od.* vi, 201 *et seq.*

³ *Od.* viii, 148 *et seq.*, 246 *et seq.*

mountain-tops, happy spirits fill all nature, and before Destiny all must bow. The rites of hospitality, the protection of the suppliant, the ceremonies connected with burial are all characteristic of the northern peoples.¹ Other features may belong to the ancient tradition and reflect the love and appreciation of nature and of the arts of peace so evident in Minoan art. Most of them, doubtless, are the work of the genius of the poet himself in interpreting the finest sentiments of his own age. The greatness and the immortality of Homer find their source in this. His pictures hold all men because they are so thoroughly human; they reach the summit of human joy and they penetrate to the depths of human sorrow. As to his own age, the great days of the heroes were over, the wanderings had for the most part ceased. The aristocrats in whose courts the poets sang were approaching settled life and were learning the advantages of peace. Such conditions were essential for the development and perfection of so fine a flower of literature.² Men still looked back on the more stirring days of old with longing, the old songs roused the martial fire in their breasts and caused them to pray for the warrior's glory and often to seek it, for they lived in no millennium of peace. But men were no longer as they had been. Those noble days were past. Newer days had come and the poet saw peace at hand. When the strife at Ithaca was over, Athena ended it with her blessing. "So may both sides love one another as of old and let peace and wealth abundant be their portion."³ Thus may the apparent contradiction between Hector and the Phaeacians be accounted for.⁴

¹ Cf. Schrader, *Die Indogermanen* (Leipzig, 1911), *passim*.

² Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature grecque* (Paris, 1887), vol. i, p. 86.

³ *Od.* xxiv, 485.

⁴ This appears to the writer as a more satisfactory explanation of the so-called expurgations than that of ascribing them to later periods, cf. Murray, *op. cit.*, ch. v.

The poets of the *Epic Cycle*, probably more directly under the influence of Ægean survivals, preserved in their epics those things which Homer deleted. Of these poems there are but few fragments. In Alexandrian times they were cut up and arranged around the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to form a complete story. Of this, a later writer, Proclus, wrote an epitome of which some parts have survived along with a few snatches of the poems themselves. With these and by the aid of the dramatists of Athens who found their subjects in the poems, it is possible to gain some conception of the ideas of the poets of the *Epic Cycle*.¹

The migrations had convinced these men that there were too many people on the earth and they conceived a curious prototype of the Malthusian theory as an explanation for the Trojan war. In answer to the appeal of Mother Earth, who was made weary by the burden of men wandering over her bosom, Zeus had brought on the war, with Helen as his tool, and thus had removed a large number of Achæans and Trojans.² The sacrifice of Iphigeneia at Aulis, weakened in the later telling by the story of the substitution of a doe, the sacrifice of Polyxena before the return home, the curious wounding of Philoctetes, Odysseus' purification of Achilles from blood-guilt after the murder of Thersites, the appearance of the ghost of Achilles to warn Agamemnon, are instances of the survival of earlier tales which suggest Minoan influence. The poets presented in bloody detail the death of Priam at the fall of Troy, the mournful captivity of Andromache, and the murder of Astyanax when he was hurled from the tower, with the heartless comment, "Foolish is he who, slaying the father, spareth the children."³

Of the Theban epics with their tale of the ill-fated family

¹ Lawton, *Successors of Homer* (London, 1898).

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ Andrew Lang, *World of Homer* (London, 1910), chs. xv, xviii; Lawton, *op. cit.*, pp. 19, 32.

of Oedipus and its long list of horrible crimes, little is known save through later treatment. One fragment which survives contains the curse which Oedipus called down upon his two sons, and which was the cause of all their later woes, that strife and battle should ever continue between them.¹ These pictures but set in higher relief the humanity of Homer.

As Homer and his fellow bards are the representatives of the princely courts with their martial longings, Hesiod is the voice of the common man. With the return to settled conditions and peaceful circumstances the farmer might turn himself once again with some amount of security to the cultivation of his land and the care of his buildings, and might plan for the future. The soil was thin, life and the fates were hard; in the farmer's calendar was no time for the wars in which the martial desires of the rulers and the ever-present boundary disputes involved him. As his spokesman, Hesiod protested against that strife which exulted in evil and multiplied wars and contentions through the will of the immortal gods.² The fault lay in the wickedness of man. In olden days, so the poet sang, there had been a Golden Age when men lived in peace and quiet on their lands with all good things. The Silver Age had brought the beginnings of evil, and the Bronze Age had created a race of warlike men terrible and strong whose delight was in the works of dolorous Ares and in insolence. The race of heroes had followed, but they had been destroyed by war and battle before Thebes and Troy, and after them had come the culmination of evil in the rulers of his own age. He bewails the fact that he had not died before or been born after the race of Iron.³ In that race he saw all that was wrong.

¹ Lawton, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 *et seq.*

² Hesiod, *Erga*, ed. Rzach (Leipzig, 1908), trans. Mair (Oxford, 1908), 14 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 109 *et seq.*

Might shall be right and one shall sack the other's city. Neither shall there be any respect of the oath-abiding or of the just or of the good. Rather shall they ever honor the doer of evil and the man of insolence. Right shall lie in the might of hand and Reverence shall be no more.¹

These are the causes of war and of woe. But he points to the solution, which is justice. Where that is practised cities flourish and people prosper. Peace, nurse of children, is at hand and keeps famine away, and Zeus never decrees war for them.² But where the spirit of contention prevails there follow

painful Toil and Oblivion and tearful Grievs and Wars and Battles and Murders and Manslayings and Quarrels and false Speeches and Disputes and Lawlessness and Ruin, of one character one with another and which most afflicteth men on earth when any of his will sweareth falsely.³

Of like character are the gods whom Hesiod represents as watching over and rejoicing in war; Athena Tritogeneia, driver of the spoils, a dread goddess, waker of battles and leader of the host, the unwearied one whose pleasure is in din and war and battle; Ares, insatiate of war, sacker of cities, piercer of shields, with his children, Rout and Fear, who drive in confusion the ranks of men. In contrast to them he sings of those children of Zeus, and of bright Themis, who is justice personified, Eunomia, law, Dike, justice, and Eirene, peace, who care for the works of mortal men, always companions each of other.⁴ Happy the state in which they dwell!

¹ Hesiod, *Erga*, 189 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, 225.

³ *Id.*, *Theog.* 226.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 901 et seq., 924 et seq., 933 et seq.; *Erga*, 225 et seq.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE CITY-STATE

THE great basis of all Hellenic life, thought and action in the classic period was the city-state. The necessity for defense and the many political and social advantages of concentration caused the union of the small villages of tribal days into the larger and better fortified city. To it were transferred all the old institutions of the tribe—political and religious. Since all in the tribe were a part of the organization whether they lived in the city or in the surrounding country, while all political life centered in the city, the city and the state became synonymous. The tribal deity became the founder and protector of the city. Tribal feeling was transformed into local patriotism, which rested on loyalty to local divinities, a great sanctification of territory and withal a strong attitude of independence and exclusiveness. The sacred right of any city-state, no matter how small, to rule itself and to keep itself apart from all others became the fundamental principle of all Greek political life. It formed the greatest obstacle to any attempt at union.¹

Nature made communication by land difficult and kept the Greeks apart in their little valleys, and aided in this disunion. Diversities of dialect surviving from tribal days were accentuated. Local variations in the calendar, differences in time and ritual of religious festivals, separate sys-

¹Cf. Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1915), 2nd ed., pp. 64, 5.

tems of coinage and weights and measures, were fertile in producing distinctions and mutual distrust. The quarrels which inevitably followed, the desire for and the fear of domination, the apparent impossibility of lasting union without the sacrifice of precious freedom of action, were prolific causes of wars and dissensions.

Nature furnished another cause for war when it refused to the Greeks sufficient supplies of food. Even in the days after the development of widespread commerce the very life of the city-state depended on its control of the valleys whence food might be secured. That city which controlled them was in a position to dominate all the neighboring communities. Most early wars, therefore, were fought for the possession of territory. After the development of commerce the desire for the control of trade-routes added another basis for disputes.¹

The city-state, however, was productive of most that was best in Hellenic civilization. Concentration within narrow limits wrought a greater intensity of political life, a higher consciousness of political feeling, which in turn caused those manifold experiments in the art of government. The desire to glorify the state and its gods, to beautify the city and to secure for it leadership in the arts of peace and of war led to the production of the finest works of Hellenic genius. The intensity of the Greek's devotion to his native city cannot be overestimated. Death for the *polis* was far preferable to banishment. The happiest man whom the statesman knew was he who, after a comfortable life in which he had seen his children develop, died in battle for his homeland.²

Certain elements of concord existed to mitigate the evils

¹ Zimmern, *op. cit.*, ch. v.

² Herodotus, ed. Stein, H., 2 vols. (Berlin, 1869-71), translated by Rawlinson, G., 2 vols. (New York, 1910), i, 30.

The oracle, however, spread its influence far beyond the dwellers around and, except when it fell under the influence of some powerful state or party, preserved its reputation for impartiality. It was courted by the wealthy kings of Lydia and of Phrygia as well as sought by the humblest Greek, and to each it gave its answer. Disputes were brought to the god for settlement and wars were averted or ended. Unfavorable utterances delayed or prevented hostilities. Its disfavor was feared. In these ways it played its part in the ending of interstate anarchy among the Greeks. Its position was rather one of influence than of power.¹

The work of union begun by the Olympic games was furthered by the development of games in honor of the Pythian god, to which were added the Isthmian and Nemean festivals. To advance the prosperity of the festivals and to make it possible for embassies to travel at all seasons of the year sacred roads were built along the main lines of traffic. Though religious in purpose, they formed good routes of communication for the trader as well and aided in binding the mainland together.²

The growth of political organization in the city-state combined with the development of trade and industry to effect many changes in the conditions of life, which reflected themselves in the field of interstate relations. Private war came to an end. Criminal justice in the hands of the state under the gods took the place of the old-time feud. The citizen secured protection for life and property from the magistrate and no longer went armed about his business. The noble hung his swords and spears and shields on the walls of his armory, whence he took them only at the

¹ Botsford, *op. cit.*

² Curtius, *History of Greece*, 5 vols. (New York, 1907), vol. ii, p. 42.

behest of state or party. The very character of warfare had changed. Mining and industry had cheapened armor so that the commoner could fit himself for war. The newly developed phalanx came to be more important in battle than magnificently caparisoned nobles. Fighting then ceased to be the glory of the upper classes and became the duty of every citizen. The state and not the individual leader called the man to war. The individualist adventurer found plenty of excitement in the still unsettled regions of the new colonies, while men went to Egypt and to Babylonia to enlist in the armies of the Oriental kings.¹

Interstate relations entered upon a new epoch. The well-organized city-state was better able to execute a foreign policy, to make and to keep agreements than had been the shifting tribes of earlier days. With the occupation of the country migratory movements on the mainland of Greece had ceased. No longer did men live by raiding and piracy, except when practised on a large scale as by Polycrates of Samos, ceased to be an honorable profession. Corinth took the place of ancient Minos and rid the Ægean of these pests. Religion and custom combined to regulate the character of war. The Delphic rules were of local application, but there were more general laws which all observed. Formal declaration of war by heralds took the place of the sudden raid of the time of Achilles. Heralds and envoys were under the protection of the gods and it was a sin to injure them even if they were barbarians.² The importance of the fields to the life of the state led to the growth of the phalanx for their defence, and this rather unwieldy formation resulted in a type of battle fought always according to well-established practices. The battle

¹ Beloch, *op. cit.*, i, 1, pp. 281 *et seq.*, 316 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 315 *et seq.*

ranted or their positions were sufficiently secure, the tyrants tended to avoid war and to advance their own influence and the position of their cities by other means. Prominent men of other states, poets, artists and philosophers, were invited to come and add to the brilliance of their courts, with resultant cultural interchange and better mutual understanding. The commercial horizon of their cities was widened by wise measures. In advancing their own power they affected the other states as well. Thus Periander of Corinth developed the Isthmian games. He frequently acted as arbiter in disputes between warring states. Cleisthenes of Sicyon brought his state into close relation with others by taking a leading part in the first Sacred War and by securing a marriage alliance with a powerful family of Athens. Similarity of position produced a feeling of dependence among the tyrants themselves. They sent envoys back and forth, exchanged ideas and methods and established a sort of entente between their cities.¹

The greatest work of the tyrants in the cause of Panhellenism was in their treatment of the epic tradition. The legends of the gods, the stories of early wars and great heroes furnished to the Greeks that basis of common history, the spirit of which alone makes a people into a nation. The Trojan war represented a national movement, not the effort of any one city, and in its glories the Greek felt a thrill of pride that was Hellenic, not local. Already these poems were so widely known that men in all localities understood the language used and employed it in their own writings.² It was these tales, possibly, which inspired Pheidon of Argos to his attempt.

The poems were used as evidence for the settlement of

¹ Beloch, *op. cit.*, vol. i, 1, p. 356. There are many instances of these things given in Herodotus.

² Beloch, *op. cit.*, vol. i, 1, pp. 309 *et seq.*

disputes¹ and all Greek states sought a place in the catalogue of ships in the Iliad. Still it was in the court of the noble that the rhapsodist sang the lays. They were regarded as the possession of the aristocracy. The tyrants in their endeavor to break down the prestige of the nobles created new festivals and at them made the epics the heritage of every man. Tradition ascribes to Peisistratus of Athens the writing down of the poems that all might have a correct version.²

Language came to form an added bond. Homer apparently knew no difference between Greek and Trojan in language or religion. The growth of oracle, of festival to which only Greeks were admitted, and of mart, made evident a community of language. In this the epic played a leading part. Hesiod and Archilochus were the first to apply the term Hellenes to all Greeks.³ However, it was when the Greek came into contact with the outside world, with people whom he could not understand and to whom he therefore applied the name *barbaros*, that he felt most keenly his kinship with all the Greeks. It must be remembered, however, that there is no evidence for ascribing to this period the contempt expressed by later philosophers for barbarians. On the contrary, it is evident that Lydians and Phrygians were both respected and courted, and that the same rules of warfare were enforced by the gods on the relations between Greeks and barbarians as among the Greeks themselves.⁴

The most important and ever-present impulse to peace and unity after religion was to be found in commerce. Its

¹ Raeder, *L'Arbitrage international chez les Hellenes* (New York, 1912), p. 19.

² Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (2nd ed., Gotha, 1895), vol. ii, p. 373.

³ Hesiod, *Erga* 653; Archilochus, fr. 52.

⁴ Herodotus vi, 48; vii, 136.

interests were served in the festivals; it was a vital factor in the cause and in the success of many colonies; it added to the tyrant's zeal; it bound states together by the closest ties, those of mutual self-interest; it played the greatest part in the development of interstate relations; but it was also the cause of bitter wars between rival states for the control of the highways of trade and of the markets themselves. So closely were the cities held by commercial interests that a quarrel between two trading cities, Chalcis and Eretria, over a little plain on the island of Euboea, involved most of the prominent Greek states of that day in the semi-mythical Lelantine war.¹

Commercial necessity compelled a partial abandonment of the rigid exclusiveness which religion enjoined in the treatment of the foreign trader in the city markets. To satisfy the religious exigencies of the situation, the old and time-honored family custom of guest-friendship was developed into a form of consulship. States secured guest-friends, *proxenoi*, from among the prominent citizens of other states. It was the duty of such men to look after the interests of the state they befriended, to take care of its citizens when they arrived, to see that they were justly treated, to represent them in the courts and to aid them in the transaction of their business. Save in Sparta, where strangers were unwelcome and were frequently invited by the ephors to depart, and where accordingly the appointment of *proxenoi* was kept in the hands of local authorities, the state to be represented chose its own guest-friend. The right thus bestowed became hereditary and usually one of the most prized possessions of the family. *Proxenia* became a well-established institution in the sixth century, the recognized right of a citizen and a part of the machinery used to secure the enforcement of treaties. It created in the state a party

¹ Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 456.

favorable to the foreign state, which acted frequently as a deterrent to war and an aid to alliances.¹

The existence of a large number of evenly-balanced states produced a sort of equilibrium in the Hellenic world. It was difficult for one state to secure a decision over another in war. The consequent length of the struggles and the uncertainty of success led to the use of other means to settle disputes.² Champions were chosen to defend the cause of their cities and prevent useless shedding of blood, as in the famous war between Argos and Sparta over the Thyreatis when three hundred Argives fought an equal number of Spartans.³ Herodotus tells a curious tale of a strife in the Chersonesus which was settled by a fight between two men, two horses and two dogs.⁴ This method did not avail. Indeed, in the case of the Thyreatic war it was followed by another battle between the armies of the opposing states. Recourse was therefore had to arbitration. Later Greeks ascribed the origin of this institution to the gods. The earliest cases reported among men are purely legendary. The first historical case was in a quarrel between Chalcis and Andros over the village of Acanthus in the Chalcidice, which was settled in favor of Andros by the Samians, Parians, and Erythreans.⁵ Five Spartans decided the question between Megara and Athens over the possession of Salamis in favor of Athens after a long and disastrous war had failed to accomplish a decision.⁶ Perikander arbitrated the war between Athens and Mytilene over the control of the Hellespont on a basis of *status quo*,

¹ Phillipson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 147 *et seq.*

² Raeder, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

³ Herodotus, i, 82.

⁴ *Id.*, v, 1.

⁵ Raeder, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, *et seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17, *et seq.*

a virtual victory for Mytilene,¹ and he used his good offices to bring to an end a profitless struggle between Miletus and the Lydians.² The boundaries of Elis and Arcadia were fixed by an Olympic victor, Pyttalus,³ and the Corinthians settled a quarrel between Athens and Thebes over Platea.⁴ All of these cases concerned matters vital to the interests of the states involved, but in all except the last the decision of the arbiters was accepted as final. There were doubtless many other instance of disputes ended by this means besides these few which have survived. By the end of the sixth century it had become so well recognized that after the Ionian revolt the Persians ordered the states under their control to settle all their arguments in this way.⁵ It was employed more, however, judging from the evidence at hand, to end than to prevent wars.

In spite of all these movements in the direction of peace, wars were regular and continuous. The aggressive character of the Greek, the preference which he showed for settling arguments by a fight rather than by a compromise involved him in broils with his neighbors, both Hellenic and barbarian. War remained a customary part of the citizen's existence.

The same influences which were affecting the relations of the Greeks with each other, religion, politics and commerce, reflected themselves in the æsthetic life of the people. Wealth, luxury and refinement, contact through trade with the older civilizations of the Orient, the desire to glorify the city, its gods and its victorious athletes, to sing the

¹ Raeder, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, *et seq.*

² Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 466.

³ Raeder, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵ Herodotus, vi, 42; *cf.* Westermann, "International Arbitration in Antiquity" in *Classical Journal*, ii (1906-7), pp. 197, *et seq.*

praise of leader and of party, all led to the outburst of a new period of art and literature. In the great epics of old, men found inspiration and delight. But for themselves they sought different fields. They made mock of the stately hexameter by writing such comic epics as the *Batrachomyomachia*, the Battle between the Frogs and the Mice. Then in varying meters they sang songs of party strife, of love and wine and nature, or rallied their countrymen to the defense of native land against present enemies. Their artistic sense expressed itself in temples, in statues and in beautifully painted vases. Discovering themselves as individuals in a great universe, they began to ask the questions of how and why, and the new science of philosophy developed. The expression of their age, these artists, poets and philosophers filled a mutual need; wherever they went they found a ready welcome; in many quarters their presence was earnestly solicited; they spoke the language of art which all could understand, and they became, no less than the great poets of the epic age, the common property of all Greeks and an added bond of union. In the endeavor to find out something of what they thought, it is necessary to remember that we have but the barest fragments of their works and conclusions must be drawn sparingly. All that is possible is to notice the general trend of their opinions as indicated in what evidence there is at hand.

The leaders in this fresh life were to be found in the great and wealthy trading cities along the coast of Asia Minor. It was a stirring age, "a period of courts and tyrannies, of colonial prosperity, of political animation, of social intrigues, of intellectual development, of religious transformation, of change and uncertainty in every department."¹ Wars there were aplenty, between neighboring states, with the threatening powers of Lydia and Phrygia,

¹ Symonds, *Studies of the Greek Poets* (London, 1893), vol. i, p. 239.

with the invading Cimmerians, later with the overwhelming power of Persia, with the aggressive cities of the western side of the Ægean, in addition to civil strife at home. Yet there were adventurers who looked farther afield. They thronged into the colonies, they filled the armies of the Saite kings with mercenaries;¹ and the brother of the poet Alcaeus won great renown by fighting a giant in far-off Babylon.² To these same cities came all the products of the Mediterranean and the Orient. Tradition ascribed to them the foundation of new industries. They became a synonym for luxury and refinement and elegance.³

All of these things are reflected in the literature of the age. Of the oldest of the poets, Callinus of Ephesus, who lived about seven hundred B. C., there remains but one elegy. The Cimmerians had swept over Lydia, destroyed Magnesia and were threatening Ephesus. Callinus called his people to battle in a stirring poem, the main thought of which is:

The enemy are wasting the land. Do you think you are at peace then? Cease to slumber, but arise and fight! When the fates will, man must die, and there is no escape. He who dies in war is mourned by all, while he who wins and lives is held as almost divine.⁴

Language and idea are Homeric. When it is remembered that the city was successful in its defence, this poem seems to be hardly sufficient evidence on which to build the assumption that the Ephesians were effete and peace-loving.⁵

Closely akin to Callinus in thought, more vigorous in

¹ Collitz, 5261; cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 479.

² Alcaeus, fr. 33.

³ Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization* (New York, 1915), p. 203.

⁴ Callinus, fr. 1.

⁵ Cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 464.

personality, and certainly the product of no slothful age stands his younger contemporary Archilochus.¹ Born in Paros, colonizer of Thasos with the willing consent of his native city, restless warrior depending on his lance for his livelihood, he is the personification of Greek aggressiveness. The range of his interests and the vigorous force of his personality which he expressed in his poems differentiate him from the writers of the *épopée*. He wrote religious poems, fables as satires, and a long series of personal poems on topics varying from wine to shipwreck. The literary importance of his work rests on the fact that he is the first Greek to use the poetic medium to express himself as an individual, and in so doing broke the bonds of the older meters and created new standards. He described himself as a soldier and a poet. "I am the servant of the lord Enyalios and I am skilled in the lovely gift of the Muses."² He is as keen for a fight as a thirsty man for a drink.³ His philosophy is that of a soldier of fortune. "Hearten the young warriors but trust to the gods for victory."⁴ All things are in the hands of the gods. They set men up and knock them down. The only remedy that he finds is endurance and moderation.

Endure, endure my soul, disquieted by griefs beyond remedy and setting thy breast against the foe, hold thy ground, taking thy stand firm and close amid the spears of the enemy. If thou conquerest, exult not openly, and if thou art conquered, lie not down in thy house and mourn. Rejoice in that which is meet for rejoicing and grieve not overmuch at calamities, but learn what condition prevails among men.⁵

He laughs at the loss of his shield, that greatest of dis-

¹ Hauvette, A., *Un poète ionien du VII^e siècle, Archilogue; sa vie et ses poésies* (Paris, 1905).

² Archilochus, fr. 1.

³ *Id.*, fr. 68.

⁴ *Id.*, fr. 55.

⁵ *Id.*, fr. 6.

graces, thereby creating a precedent for later lyric poets.¹ His sense of the eternal fitness of things warns him that "it is not noble to make mock of the dead among men."² His ideal man is the true warrior, not the prancing swash-buckler with his curls and disdainful looks, but the little man, bow-legged, who stands firmly on his feet, with heart full of courage.³ He excelled most as a poet when he turned the inspiration of the Muses to the service of Ares.

Of the peaceful side of life in the seventh century, Semonides of Amorgos and Mimnermus of Colophon are representative. The former is best known for his satire on women. His chief philosophy was the avoidance of troubles, of which war was one.⁴ Mimnermus, on the other hand, wrote a war poem with wonderful richness of language, praising the martial virtues of Ionian heroes. His greatest theme, however, was not war, but love and youth.

His name has passed into a proverb for luxurious verse, saddened by reflections on the fleeting joys of youth and the sure and steady progress of old age and death. They (his poems) breathe the air of sunny gardens and cool banquet rooms in which we picture the poet lingering out a pensive life, endeavoring to crowd his hours with pleasures of all kinds, yet ever haunted and made fretful among his roses by the thought of wrinkles and death.⁵

These men are the earliest signs of the transformation from Homeric days.

Of the era of adventure and political strife which ushered in the sixth century the best proponent is the Lesbian Al-

¹ Arch., fr. 66.

² *Id.*, fr. 7.

³ *Id.*, fr. 58.

⁴ Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature grecque* (Paris, 1891), vol. ii, pp. 192 et seq.

⁵ Symonds, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 227 et seq.

caeus. A noble, a politician, a soldier, a traveler, a *bon vivant*, he is the product of Mytilene at the height of its greatest splendor. Pittacus, law-giver and one of the seven sages, ranks with the best of the period in the field of political thought. But Alcaeus represents all sides of the vigorous life of the time. He took part in the war with Athens over Sigeium where, like Archilochus, he lost his shield after an honorable defeat. After this episode he was driven into exile by the success of the democratic tyrants. Travels in Egypt followed, till he was pardoned and returned to home and a settled life.¹ His poems of love and wine are best known, but they show only one side of his character. He was possessed by an ardent love for his country and a desire to fight for her even though men he regarded as fools had thrown her into confusion.² He believed fully in the righteousness of his party's cause, and his songs of party strife with which he rallied his comrades are full of martial fire. His halls flashed with the bronze of the helmets, corselets, greaves, shields and swords of Chalcis, which he held ready for the day of their use.³ War he regarded as the allotted task of grown men, an affair befitting their estate.⁴ On the youths who assumed a task not theirs and rushed into the first rank when danger threatened, recking little of themselves, he bestowed the highest honors that he might. For himself, Athena was *polemadokos*, giver of war.⁵ "For it is glorious to die in service to Ares."⁶ Yet the same man called friends out to sail on the

¹ Easby-Smith, *Songs of Alcaeus* (Washington, 1901).

² Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁴ Edmonds, J. M. in *Classical Review*, vol. xxx (1916), p. 100.

⁵ Alcaeus in Bergk, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, fr. 9.

⁶ *Id.*, fr. 30.

bay in the morning or to join in a pleasant drinking bout and wrote beautiful poems of spring.¹ The outlook of men was ever widening.

Sappho, contemporary of Alcaeus, was more a product of the happy freedom and wealth of the social life of Mytilene. She stands supreme among the poetesses of love.

The fairest thing in all the world some say is a host of horsemen, and some a host of foot, and some again a navy of ships, but to me 'tis the heart's beloved—one of whom I would rather the sweet sound of her footfall and the sight of the brightness of her beaming face than all the chariots and armoured footmen of Lydia.²

Erotic poetry reached its culmination for this century in Anacreon of Teos.³ His life was typical of the age. Driven from Teos by local disturbances he settled at Abdera in Thrace, where he took part in wars with the native Thracians. After his poetry became famous he spent many years in the court of that piratical despot and adventurer, Polycrates of Samos. From there he went to the court of Hippias at Athens. Amid scenes of splendor and glory he clung to the golden mean, envied not pomp and power and wealth, but desired tranquility and happiness above all.⁴ Eros and Dionysos were his most loved divinities. In an epigram he described war as an evil, for it took away the bravest of the city's youth and left the coward in his place.⁵ He did not care for the old-style poet with his tales of war. "I do not love the man who, drinking from a full cup, tells of strife and grievous war, but he who remembers to mingle

¹ Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

³ Wright, *History of Greek Literature* (New York, 1907), pp. 102, *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵ Bergk, *op. cit.*, Anacreon, fr. 101.

the glorious gifts of the Muses and of Aphrodite with their lovely cheer." ¹ In his own military experience he followed the precedent of Archilochus and Alcaeus by throwing away his shield.² He was willing to leave war to those who wished to fight.³

The broadening and deepening of the currents of intellectual life produced at the same time a Thales. This man, who was merchant, traveler, statesman, engineer, mathematician, astronomer and physical philosopher, was the embodiment of the best sides of Ionian life. He drew inspiration from every source, Egypt, Babylon, Lydia, and Miletus with its widespread commerce. What he learned he turned to the advantage of his fellow-countrymen and himself for their success in trade and in war. He apparently took an active part in the defence of his country against Lydia and Persia, and urged upon the Ionians the advantages of union for the preservation of peace and freedom. His work as the founder of physical science is well known. It was, however, but a small part of his activities.⁴ His successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, confined themselves rather to the pursuit of philosophy, though Anaximander produced a map which embodied all the knowledge of the many travelers of Miletus.⁵

The intellectual and social pleasures of prosperity did not, however, detract from the patriotism or fighting zeal of the Ionians. Lack of union, not lack of bravery, drew them under the subjection of the Lydians, a people whom Herodotus called the bravest and most warlike of all Asia.⁶

¹ Anacreon, fr. 94.

² *Id.*, fr. 28.

³ *Id.*, fr. 92.

⁴ Marshall, *A Short History of Greek Philosophy* (London, 1898), p. 2.

⁵ Herodotus, i, 74, 75, 170.

⁶ Marshall, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 *et seq.*

⁶ Herodotus, i, 79.

Lydian commercial interests demanded control of the coast cities. For the magnificent chariots and horsemen of the inland kingdom the small city-states were no match. Still each successive king of Lydia found himself compelled to reduce the Greeks again, city by city. Miletus, by a long resistance to Alyattes, preserved for itself independence and an alliance on favorable terms.¹ A commercial league which seems to have been formed under the leadership of Phocaea was apparently of no avail in military matters.² The culmination of Lydian control came after Croesus had made war upon the cities singly and subdued again all but Miletus. He followed his conquest up by making treaties of alliance with the islanders and by showering favors upon such centers of Greek influence as the Delphic oracle. As a result of his desires to win Greek friendship the burden of his rule was so light that the cities refused to revolt at the request of Cyrus of Persia. After the overthrow of Croesus, Cyrus accordingly refused to allow them to retain their former arrangements with the Lydian kingdom, except for Miletus, which was granted its old terms. In spite of the fact that these cities were by far the feeblest of all the Greek states, with no great cities save Miletus, whose support they lacked, they determined to resist. They fortified their towns, held meetings to secure united action and sent abroad to Sparta for aid. It was on this occasion that Thales advised the union of the Ionians into a single state with Teos as its center, the cities retaining their local autonomy. Help was not forthcoming and unity was impossible.³ Harpagus, general of Cyrus, attacked and took the cities one by one. Though they resisted bravely and with many feats of arms, they were no match for the might of Persia. Their war-

¹ Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 19.

² Hill, *Historical Greek Coins* (New York, 1906), pp. 8, *et seq.*

³ Herodotus i, 170.

riors were forced into the armies of Persia and their cities were placed under the control of native tyrants.

During the period of Persian control of the mainland Polycrates endeavored to secure domination of the islands, and thence of the mainland itself. "Polycrates," said Herodotus, "was the first of mere human birth who conceived the design of gaining the empire of the sea and aspired to rule over Ionia and the islands."¹ Treachery put an end to himself and to his attempt.

One more effort was made by the Asiatic Greeks to secure their freedom in the famous Ionian revolt, led by Aristagoras of Miletus.² Against the advice of Hecataeus, the historian, who thought Miletus too weak and Persia too strong,³ they secured unity of action among themselves and were successful in getting aid from Athens after Sparta had refused. The burning of Sardis was followed by a defeat near Ephesus, after which they dispersed to their own cities. Athens withdrew, tribe after tribe and city after city were taken, and Miletus itself was besieged. Not even the promise of favorable treatment won the Greeks from their union. Discipline in the fleet, however, could not be secured and they were badly defeated at Lade. Miletus fell and its inhabitants were sold into slavery. Though the cities were restored to democratic government and arbitration was enjoined upon them for the settlement of their disputes, the Ionians had fallen forever from their high estate. As the result of this subjection, the name Ionian became a reproach and the cultural leadership of Hellas followed all spirited Ionians who were left, to the West.

With Ionia in the development of art and literature, in wealth and luxury in early times ranked Sparta. Agricul-

¹ Herodotus iii, 122.

² Busolt, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 540 *et seq.*

³ Herodotus v, 15.

ity rule. There was no tribute and complete independence was the lot of all, save that all furnished troops to the army, which was under the command of the Spartan kings. This loosely-knit body was the military backbone of Greece, courted by all who desired aid. But culture had been sacrificed to military prowess.¹

Elsewhere on the mainland culture was developing. A school of athletic sculpture under the spell of the games had developed, and the careful study of the body paved the way for later heights of art. Poets and poetesses flourished in Argos, in Megara and even in Boeotia. Of these, Theognis is the best known and most significant. A talented noble of wealth and position, he began his life under the most favorable conditions, which he prayed Zeus and Apollo to maintain free from evil.² Music, poetry, wine and amours were his delight, knowledge his quest.³ He lamented the growing power of money which made it possible for the wealthy but baser element to intermarry with the well-born.⁴ To the strife between the nobility and the commercial class he endeavored to maintain an intellectual superiority. But when the blow came and the aristocrats were overthrown he was forced into flight, his property was seized and he fell into the direst poverty. He endeavored to reconcile himself to the loss by recourse to his Muse, though he wondered at the plan of Zeus which upheld the wicked and cast down the righteous.⁵ The time of his exile was spent first in Thebes and Euboea. Then he followed the footsteps of many exiled litterateurs to Sicily. There he regained fortune, took part in a war for the defence of Syracuse, secured

¹ Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 610.

² Bergk, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, Theognis 1-10.

³ *Ibid.*, 531-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 183-192.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 373, *et seq.*

pardon and a return to his native land, and possibly lived to see the Persian menace sweep down upon the country. The widespread popularity of his poems and the readiness with which he was welcomed in his wanderings is evidence of how strong a bond of union these new poets had become. The man he honored most was not the warrior of Tyrtaeus or Archilochus, but him who remained faithful and firm, bound by honor, steadfast through good and ill, impregnable alike to danger and to gain.¹ War, save in defence of native land, seemed to him utterly useless. He went into it shamed by the call of the herald rather than from any martial longings.

May peace and wealth possess the state, that I may revel with others, for evil war I do not love. Give not thine ear too much when the herald shouts loud and far. For we do not join battle for our fatherland. Yet is it disgraceful when one is present and mounted on a swift-footed steed not to look upon tearful war.²

When the threat of Persian advance was hanging over Greece he prayed to the gods that he might be inspired to charm the people into fearlessness of the danger. To Apollo he prayed to save his city from the arrogant army of the Medes in spite of the disunion of the Greeks, which he feared.³

The last great state to enter upon the new life was Athens, though Thucydides states that Attica suffered least from the recurrent invasions, and the Athenians were therefore the first to lay aside their arms and attain conditions of peace.⁴ At a very early period the whole district was united into the city-state of Athens, partly by peaceful per-

¹ Theognis, 77-86.

² *Ibid.*, 756-768, 773-782.

³ *Ibid.*, 885-890.

⁴ Thuc. i, 6.

suasion and partly by force.¹ Mountain barriers discouraged such expansion as Sparta was undertaking and the Athenian nobility turned themselves to securing control of the best lands of Attica itself. The ever-present necessity for more food than Attica produced led inevitably to commercial growth. For this an essential element was the possession of the island of Salamis which commanded the port of Athens and was in the control of their flourishing industrial and commercial neighbor, Megara. An attempt to take it resulted in a long-drawn-out guerilla warfare, in which the Athenians were so badly defeated that the ruling class, who were more interested in agriculture, forbade any one suggesting another effort to secure the island. The result was a shattering of Athenian commercial interests, which doubtless became a factor in the crisis which led to the laws of Draco and the reforms of Solon. The latter statesman saw the necessity and the possibilities of Athenian commerce and felt the disgrace of the cowardice thus displayed. With his warlike elegies which he sang in the market-place he stirred the people up to the recapture of Salamis.² This success encouraged the Athenians to further ventures overseas. A desire for a share in the rich trade with the Euxine Sea and the advantages there to be gained in the way of food-supply, led to the establishment of a garrison at Sigium in the northwest corner of the Troad at the mouth of the Hellespont. It was not a colony but a fort for the protection of trade. At the same time it broke the connection between Megara and her colonies in the Pontus.³ This undertaking, in which Athens had the support of her sister city, Miletus, led to that war between Athens and Mytilene which was settled by the arbitration of Periander. Civil

¹ Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 90-93.

² Bergk, *op. cit.*, vol. ii; Solon, fr. 1; cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 247.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 249-254.

troubles put an end temporarily to this movement. Salamis and the footing on the Hellespont were both lost.¹

The administration of Solon laid the foundation for later Athenian industry and commerce. He attracted to Athens foreign artisans and organized the Athenian coinage system on the Euboic standard, thereby cutting off the dependence of Athens on the Megarians and the Æginetans and starting a feud with Ægina which was to last until the fifth century.² Peisistratus built on these foundations. He established the peasant farmer in security and gave to Athens the backbone of the state. Under his guidance Athenian vase manufacture and trade expanded to wide proportions. He invited to his court artist and writer and prepared the way for Athenian leadership in thought. A new war with Mytilene gave him full control over Sigeium, and the foundation of Sestos made Athenian control over the Hellespont secure. His relations with the Thracian coast became later Athenian policy. He was on friendly terms with the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians, and endeavored to secure for Athens leadership among the Ionians through relations with the shrine of Delos.³

At the end of the century the Athenians took part in the Ionian revolt and waged successful war against the Thebans for the control of Plataea and with the Chalcidians for the ownership of the Lelantine plain.⁴ The people were strong, vigorous and warlike, looking abroad for new fields to conquer, and the great days of Athens lay just ahead.

The Greek colonies of Sicily and Italy had expanded and become wealthy and powerful. Here Ionians who felt the lack of freedom under Lydian or Persian rule found that

¹ Bury, *History of Greece* (London, 1913), p. 196.

² Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 307.

³ *Ibid.*, § 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 441, *et seq.*

which they desired; here exiles were welcomed from whatever party, and Magna Graecia became the second home of many poets and philosophers. The wealthiest and most luxurious of the cities was Sybaris, which controlled the overland trade with western Italy. The effeminate ease and luxury of her citizens became a byword among the Greeks in later days.¹ Hard by was the smaller city of Croton, renowned for the simplicity of its life, the strictness of its discipline and the success of its athletes. In the year 510 B. C. war broke out between them. Though Sybaris put into the field, according to tradition, an army of three hundred thousand men, the Crotoniates, led by their famous athlete, Milo, were successful. In seventy days Sybaris had fallen and been destroyed. Its inhabitants were killed, sold into slavery or scattered into exile.² *Truphê kai hybris* had wrought its ruin, love of luxury and arrogance.³ It was the classic example of a city overthrown because of loss of warlike vigor. Its fate brought a shock to the entire Hellenic world. When the fall of Miletus followed, the Greeks had learned too well the fate of a captured city. A great object lesson was to teach them all the evils which followed in the train of war.

¹ Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, *et seq.*

² Grote, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 413.

³ Diodorus Siculus ed. Vogel-Fischer (Leipzig, 1888-1906), xi, 90, xii, 9, 10; Strabo, ed. Meineke (Leipzig, 1904-9), vi, 263.

CHAPTER III

I

THE PERSIAN WAR AND HELLENIC PEACE

THE movements toward union and peace which appeared in the sixth century were to be developed into a measure of success by the war with Persia in the first half of the fifth century. Foreign danger was to unite the Greeks for a time. Politician and writer were to preach the doctrine of peace among the Hellenes and war upon the barbarian. The experiences of the war were to teach man most clearly the blessings of peace and the cruelty of war.

The advance of the Persians found the Greeks divided as usual. Athens had just finished wars with Thebes and Chalcis and was quarreling with Ægina. Sparta, under the leadership of Cleomenes, had interfered in Ægina and had defeated Argos again. The one element of strength was the Peloponnesian League, which had been brought to the height of its power by the addition of Athens after the overthrow of the tyrants. On the ground of her membership in this League, Athens appealed to Sparta for aid when the forces of Darius were threatening. The story of Marathon needs no retelling. Athens used the period following for party strife, for aggression against the islanders and for a renewal of the war with Ægina. Not until the army of Xerxes was assembling were steps taken for defensive measures. In the autumn of 481 there assembled on the isthmus of Corinth a congress of deputies of all the patriotic states. This assembly formed an Hellenic League,

which was virtually an extension of the Peloponnesian. The armies of the new organization were under the command of Sparta. Athens yielded her claims to the command of the fleet in the interests of harmony. Many states remained outside — Thebes, out of jealousy for Athens; Argos, because of her hatred of Sparta; those of Thessaly out of necessity, because of their exposed position. The western Greeks were in difficulties of their own. It was this alliance, however, which fought Salamis and Plataea and began the movements of retaliation on the other side of the Ægean. To it were admitted the larger Asiatic and island cities. It remained nominally in force until the breach between Athens and Sparta in 461. Sparta had been the backbone of Hellas in the defence against Persia. As the leader of an organization which should unite all Hellenes in the Ægean and free the cities of Asia Minor, however, Sparta was a failure. Conservatism and the menace of the helots dictated a narrow Peloponnesian policy. The Lacedaemonians endeavored to keep extra-Peloponnesian states defenceless. They were not interested in the affairs of distant Hellenes. Nor were Spartan leaders a success when they were not under the immediate control of the officials of the state. They therefore willingly surrendered to Athens the command of the overseas forces when the Ionians, already in separate alliance with Athens, objected to the leadership of Pausanias. As long as Athens remained a friend and an ally and busied herself in Asiatic affairs Sparta had nothing to fear. The result was the formation of the Delian Confederacy. Projected by Themistocles, it was organized by the wisdom of Aristides. It consisted of the perpetual union of a number of states, all of which were to be equal and independent, for the defence of the Ægean against Persia. There was to be a general congress of the members at Delos under the presidency of Athens, in which all members had an equal

vote, to decide questions of peace and war. The treasury was established at Delos and was administered by twelve Athenian Hellenotamiae. The larger states furnished ships to the fleet; the smaller paid contributions according to their resources. The task of determining the duty of each state was entrusted to Aristides, who fulfilled it to the satisfaction of all. Under the generalship of Cimon the work of the confederacy was carried on until after the battle of Eurymedon in 468, when the Persians were excluded from the Ægean.¹

From the very beginning the confederacy was dominated by Athens. The Athenians were able to control a sufficient number of the small states to secure a majority in the congress. Athenians served as treasurers and managed the finances, collecting the payments of the members. In addition, Athens made separate commercial treaties with the individual states which bound them close to her. The first real step in the development of an Athenian empire came when Naxos, convinced that the danger from Persia was past and tired of making contributions, tried to secede from the alliance. Cimon put down this attempt and reduced Naxos to the condition of a subject state. The culmination of this movement was reached in the next period.

As long as Cimon was in power the policy of the Hellenic league was followed: namely, war abroad and peace at home. To this the democratic party at Athens was opposed. The failure and mistreatment by the Spartans of an Athenian expedition sent at the request of Sparta and supported by Cimon at the time of the helot revolt led to the overthrow of Cimon and a breach between Athens and Sparta. Thus the period of Hellenic peace came to an end.

The Greeks of Sicily had been united before this time,

¹ On the history of this period *cf.* Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 557, *et seq.*; vol. iii, pp. I, *et seq.*

for the most part by the might of the two great tyrants, Theron of Akragas and Gelon of Syracuse. These able men had mastered their own cities, had brought under their control the neighboring cities, had bound themselves together by marriage alliances, and had accomplished by force that union of Hellenes which the threat of Persia was to bring about in the Ægean. Together they stopped the armies of Carthage at Himera and secured favorable treaties of peace. Hieron, successor of Gelon, followed this success with the defeat of the Etruscans at Cumae in 474. The courts of the Sicilian tyrants were the most brilliant of the period. Poet and dramatist and artist found there all the freedom and appreciation which could be desired. The overthrow of the tyrannies was followed by such confusion that in 461 a congress was held of all the Sicilian states to compose matters and to re-establish the independence of all the cities.¹

The great deeds of the foreign wars in Greece and Sicily resulted in a wave of religious devotion, an increase in Hellenic self-confidence, which stimulated all activities but found its best expression in literature and art. The writers of the period reflect the spirit of their age, the glory of the deeds of the heroes, the value of Hellenic unity, and withal the horrors of war itself.

Pindar (522-442),² the greatest of lyric poets, was a native of Thebes. Though his city Medized, he himself was thoroughly patriotic. Much of his life was spent in the courts of the Sicilian tyrants. He was an aristocrat to the core and delighted chiefly in the noble achievements of young aristocrats in the service of their states, in the games and in war. His extant poems, ranging in date from 502

¹ Grote, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 236, *et seq.*

² Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 119, *et seq.*; Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, *et seq.*

to 452 B. C., are in praise of the victors in the great games. He praised the victors by glorifying their heroic ancestors and recounting the ancient legends of their cities.

Bacchylides (ca. 507-428), nephew of Simonides, succeeded to the older poet's position. He, too, sang of the glories of Hieron. His subjects are in general the same as Pindar's, but they lack the deep feeling and originality of the master poet, graceful and delightful though they are. He is the last of the classical lyric poets. Drama was thereafter to occupy the center of the literary stage.¹

Contemporary with these men was Æschylus, the precursor of the new age. Native of Eleusis, of an old Eupatrid family, educated as befitted a noble, in athletics, music and Homer, he was a follower of Cimon in his conservatism at home and Panhellenism abroad. He took part in the great battles of Marathon and Salamis, and his military experiences are reflected in his writings. Like the lyricists, he visited Sicily. His epitaph, which he is said to have written himself, indicated that he valued more highly his service to his state in war than the renown of his great contributions to the literary world.

Here Aeschylus lies in Gela's land of corn,
Euphorion's son, in far-off Athens born;
That he was valiant Marathon could show,
And long-haired Medes could tell it, for they know.²

Æschylus, who termed his own dramas morsels from Homer, followed his master in stirring pictures of war. The *Seven against Thebes* was filled, said the ancients, with the fire of mailed Ares.³ The heroes are pictured as men

¹ Jebb, *Bacchylides* (Cambridge, 1905), Introduction.

² Glover, *From Pericles to Philip* (New York, 1917), p. 43.

³ Aristophanes ed. Hall (Oxford, 1902), *Frogs* 1021.

of might and valor whose delight is in battle. Through the song of the chorus one may still hear the thunder of the chariots, the shriek of the whirling wheels, the moans of the spear-shaken air and the rattle of the stone against the battlements. No less thrilling is the description of Salamis in the *Persae*, the preparations of the Persians, the high-spirited pæans of the Greeks, the advance, the struggle, the confused crashing of ships, the victory of the Greeks and the wailing of the Persians till night put an end to the battle.¹

Yet there is little of the glory of war in the tragedies. Warrior himself, a participant in the sufferings and the triumphs of the Persian War, Æschylus knew full well the attendant hardships both to victor and to vanquished. The *Agamemnon* and the *Persae* present the results of war, the one to a people whose king is returning victorious, the other to a nation which suffers under ruinous defeat. Even when allowances have been made for the rhetorical or dramatic values, enough remains to make one feel the terrible side of war.

The *Agamemnon* opens before the return of the host while the king and his followers are still winning glory at Troy. The chorus, with an air of foreboding evil, set forth their sufferings. They think of those terrible grapples of the battlefield where men's strength fails and warriors are crushed in the dust as the war-spears clash.² Then there comes to yearning hearts in place of the brave man who went forth but an urn of cold pyre-ashes.³ Clytemnestra pictures the calamity of the wife, who is compelled to sit alone in the house apart from her lord and is

¹ Æschylus, *Tragoediae*, ed. Sidgwick (Oxford, 1899) *Seven against Thebes*, 152 et seq., 203 et seq.; 353 et seq.

² *Id.*, *Agamemnon*, 63-65.

³ *Ibid.*, 437-44.

driven many times by heart-shaking rumors to the verge of suicide.¹ In their grief the people of the outraged nation execrate their rulers for the woe they have brought upon them.

The war-god who exchangeth
Men's lives for gold,
And where the mad spear rangeth
The scales doth hold,
Sends back to hearts that yearn
For a brave man's return,
Filling one small sad urn
Pyre ashes cold.

With sighs love tells their story:—
In battle bold
Was one: one fell with glory
With garments rolled
In blood:—and each man died
All for another's bride!
In whispered pain and pride
Is the tale told.

While here grief's hushed defiance
Chides bitter-souled
Atreus' avenging scions,
There lapped in mould,
They, round the embattled steep,
In death yet comely sleep;
The land they won—and keep—
Doth them enfold.²

Amid these plaints there comes the herald of the returning army. He, too, has his tale of the hardships of a soldier's life, the more vivid when one remembers that it is a soldier who writes them.

¹ Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 859-865.

² *Ibid.*, 437-455. Way, *Aeschylus in English Verse* (London, 1908).

Of travail might I tell, bleak bivouac,
 Of iron-bound coasts, hard-lying, groans on groans—
 Who knows how many?—through the straitened days.
 Then came new ills on land to vex us more:
 Hard by our foes' walls through the night we lay;
 And dews from heaven and reek from the marshy mead
 Down-drizzled, clammy-cleaving, rotting vest,
 And making man's hair like the wild beast's fell.
 But O to tell of winters that slew birds,
 By snows of Ida made intolerable,
 Or heat, when on his noon-day couch, the sea
 Unrippled sank and slept, and no breath stirred.

Yet is his attitude that of the victor. His joy at his return home overcomes all other thoughts.

What boots to grieve o'er these? Our toils are past.
 Why of those wasted lives take nice accounts?

The Argive host is victorious, the gain outweighs the loss. At his tale of victory the people, too, lay aside their misgivings.¹

This comfort comes not to the vanquished. The poet describes the scene when

With clouded brow a herald brings
 Hideous disaster from a field of rout,
 And speaks a nation stricken with one wound,
 Speaks many a light of many a home doom-banned
 By Ares' twy-lashed scourge of fire and steel,
 Twin slaughter-curse, blood-boultered chariot pair.²

To the Persian wives and mothers who have been sighing and counting the days till their spearmen shall return, there comes the messenger of Xerxes with his tale of defeat and death, and grief overwhelms the land.³ The land cries out for her young sons killed and the pall of death covers

¹ Way, *op. cit.*, *Agamemnon* 555-584.

² *Ibid.*, 638-643.

³ Aeschylus, *Persae* 44, 61-64, 532-547.

it.¹ No word of victory lightens the gloom but each successive report tells of new losses and brings fresh sorrows.²

A worse fate than this of the Persians Æschylus ascribes to the Trojans in the *Agamemnon*,³ and threatens for the Thebans, should the Seven take the city, the plundering of wealth, the destruction of earth's precious gifts, the ruin of an ancient city, the death of warriors, the murder of helpless babes and the slavery, the terrible fate of the captive matrons and the maids.⁴ In this all too vivid picture of a scene which Homer himself deplored has not the poet in mind the destruction of Miletus and of Sybaris, and may he not be protesting against such a survival of barbarism?

Though the dramatist regards the dead hero as still comely and despises the cowardly, skulking stay-at-home, Ægisthus womanlike in heart,⁵ yet he realizes the other side of the picture, the danger to the state in the loss of the flower of its manhood. As long as its men remain, he writes, its bulwark is sure, but when they are gone its strength is brought low.⁶ So the Suppliant Maidens pray for Argos that Ares, bane of humankind, may never pluck the flower of her youth and consume the choicest of her men.⁷

War in defence of native land, Æschylus regards as justified; war on behalf of suppliants as ordered by divine law.⁸ His own part in the defence of Hellas he esteemed as the greatest act of his life.⁹ Of wars in good cause, wars

¹ Æschylus, *Persae* 710, 640, 673.

² *Ibid.*, 909 *et seq.*

³ *Id.*, *Agamemnon* 326-9.

⁴ *Id.*, *Seven against Thebes* 321 *et seq.*

⁵ *Id.*, *Agamemnon* 1224-5, *Choephoroi*, 305.

⁶ *Id.*, *Persae* 103-5, 349.

⁷ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 661-5.

⁸ *Id.*, *Suppliants*, *passim*.

⁹ *Vide supra*, p. 71.

with foreign foes, *thuraioi*, Athena in her wonderful speech in the *Eumenides* promised the Athenians enough to satisfy those in whom fierce love of glory burned, and assured them that in the glorious strife of wars she would not allow the city to be uncrowned amid the peoples.¹ Useless wars the poet would seem to condemn; such wars as the Trojan, fought for a woman; the Persian, whose foundation was arrogance of conquest; the Theban, caused by brothers' quarrels; above all, civil strife brought on by passion. Of these disputes Ares, who sells men's lives for gold, is a bitter arbitrator.² No witnesses or payments of money does he accept, but by the death of warriors he decides the cause.³

In the path of justice and moderation Æschylus finds the solution of the problem. By righteous dealings at home and with aliens the government which seeks the common weal may keep the state without calamity in peace.⁴

Fame above measure given
Brings man but woe:
Full in his eyes Zeus' levin
Flasheth its glow.
Let mine unenvied weal
Nor crush with armed heel
Cities, nor conquest feel
Nor thralldom know.⁵

Bacchylides and Pindar represent the culmination of the lyric Muse in their attitude toward war as well as in literature. The few odes and fragments of Bacchylides which survive are eloquent in praise of peace. He disliked to sing

¹ Æschylus, *Eumenides* 858-869, cf. Way, *op. cit.*

² *Id.*, *Agamemnon* 448, *Persae*, *passim*, *Seven against Thebes* 934 *et seq.*; *Eumenides* 858, *et seq.*

³ *Id.*, *Seven against Thebes* 934, *Agamemnon* 437, *Suppliants*, 933-7.

⁴ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 698-703.

⁵ Way, *op. cit.*, *Agamemnon* 467-474.

of war; for "the voice of the lyre, the clear strains of choral song accord not with the grievous stress of battle as the clash of arms hath no place amid festivity."¹ He wrote, too, of the uncertainty of war, which discerns no kinsmen in the fight but sends the death-dealing missiles blindly against the foe.² In a lyric treatment of the embassy of Menelaus and Odysseus to Troy he represented the Trojans as lifting their hands to the gods in prayer for rest from their woes. Menelaus showed to them the path of safety from war in the pursuit of unswerving Justice, attendant to Eunomia (good laws well obeyed) and prudent Themis. "Happy the land whose sons take her to dwell with them."³ In one of the most beautiful of his poems he sets forth the manifold blessings of peace.

Mighty Peace brings forth wealth for mortals and the full bloom of honey-tongued song; her gift it is that the fleshy thighs of oxen are burned to the gods in the yellow flame on the carven altars and the youths delight themselves with athletic feats and flutes and revels. Upon the iron-bound handles of the shields the spiders weave their webs and rust destroys the spears and the two-edged swords. No blast of brazen trumpet is heard nor is sleep of gentle spirit which comforteth the heart at dawn stolen from the eyelids. The streets are filled with joyous feasting and songs in praise of youths flame forth.⁴

Pindar, though his praise of victors in the games led him often to recitals of the glorious deeds of their ancestors in ancient wars and of the martial valor of the Sicilian princes themselves, nevertheless rejoiced in the fact that at the sound of the lyre even violent Ares left aside his sharp-

¹ Jebb, *Bacchylides* xiii, 12-16.

² *Ibid.*, v, 127-35.

³ *Ibid.*, xiv, 40-56.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fr. 1.

pointed spears and warmed his heart at the shrine of the Muses.¹ He proclaimed himself as one not fond of strife or contention,² and his Muse would seem to object to extravagant praise of warriors.³ A citizen of Thebes, which had Medized, he had not the background of that personal service in the Persian war which had fired Æschylus. The end of the war meant to him the removal of the Tantalus-stone which had hung over Hellas.⁴ "War may indeed be sweet to those who know it not," he said, "but once experienced it becomes a source of dread."⁵ On the other hand, he gloried in the praise of peace. "O, Kindly Peace, Daughter of Righteousness, who makest a nation great, holding the supreme keys of councils and of wars—thou knowest alike how to give and to withhold gentleness in due season."⁶ Any citizen, he proclaimed, who desired prosperity for his state must seek the radiant light of high-minded Peace.⁷ Corinth and Ægina he praised especially because in those cities were found the secure base on which cities rest—Justice and Peace, dispensers of wealth to men.⁸ He prayed for the men of Ætna as being above the desire for gain, that Zeus should shield them from wars and grant them glory in good laws and in the festivals.⁹

The poet stood by no means for peace at any price. Rather Peace herself roused to relentless wrath, he thought, had crushed the might of the Persians at Salamis and of

¹ Pindar, ed. Schroeder in Bergk, *op. cit.*, i, *Pythian*, i, 10-13.

² *Id.*, *Ol.* vi, 19.

³ *Id.*, *Ol.* vi, 21.

⁴ *Id.*, *Isthmian* vii, 5 *et seq.*

⁵ *Id.*, fr. 110.

⁶ *Id.*, *Pythian* viii, 1 *et seq.*

⁷ *Id.*, fr. 109.

⁸ *Id.*, *Ol.* xiii, 6-7; viii, 1, 22.

⁹ *Id.*, *Nemean* ix, 28-33.

the Etruscans at Cumae.¹ He rejoiced in the deeds of Athens and Ægina and of the Sicilians in their struggles against the foreign foe. In later life he praised the deeds and mourned the death of Thebans who had fought against the aggressive force of Athens.² To those who had died fighting for native land, he accorded the highest honors that were in his power to bestow.

Yet there remaineth renown for valiant men. For let whosoever in the great cloud of war keep from his beloved country the shower of blood bringing destruction upon the enemy's host know of a surety that he increaseth the renown of the race of his fellow-citizens greatly both living and dead.³

To those who survive such deeds of righteousness in youth he promised in old age a day of calm.⁴

The Ionian Revolt and the Persian Wars produced a very different reaction in Heraclitus, the recluse philosopher of Ephesus.⁵ He had seen the downfall of Ionian freedom and character and the growth of power of the successful leaders of the European Greeks. This transformation seemed to him the result of war. The warrior, he declared, received the highest honors.⁶ Gods and men united to glorify him. He became god while the weakling remained man, preserved his freedom while the rest became slaves.⁷ The philosopher attacked the people of his own city bitterly as utterly base and worthless seekers of self-interest alone.⁸ "It is clear from the drift of Heraclitus'

¹ Pindar, *Ol.* xiii, 8-12..

² *Id.*, fr. 76, 77; *Pythian* i, 72-74; *Isthmian* vi, 31 *et seq.*

³ *Id.*, fr. 78; *Isthmian* v, 26-30.

⁴ *Id.*, *Nem.* ix, 44.

⁵ Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 4 vols. (London, 1906), vol. i, p. 59 *et seq.*

⁶ Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (3d ed. Berlin, 1912), fr. 24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, fr. 53.

⁸ *Ibid.*, fr. 121.

argument that he conceived war as testing and preserving the qualities of mankind, as making a distinction between the competent and the incompetent, as founding the state and organizing society." ¹ These ideas he carried into his explanation of the universe and he enunciated the natural law of strife. "We must recognize," he said, "that war is common to all things, justice is strife, and all things come through strife and necessity." ²

II

THE AGE OF PERICLES

The breach between Athens and Sparta in 461 resulted in the division of eastern Hellas into two opposing camps, between which strife followed for hegemony. Athens under the leadership of Pericles, the head of the imperialistic democratic party, started forthwith on a career of aggrandizement. The Athenians, to secure control of the lucrative trade with the west, took charge of the helots who escaped as a result of the revolt ³ and settled them in Naupactus, at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. An alliance with the democrats of Megara on the Isthmus of Corinth was then secured. To secure an outpost against Sparta she allied herself with Argos. Her own position in the Ægean was assured by the conquest of Ægina and by the building of the Long Walls. Sparta had countered by aiding the Thebans in the re-establishment of the Boeotian League. Athens answered that manœuvre by the defeat of the Thebans and the formation of a continental federation consisting of the cities of Boeotia, of Phocis and eastern Locris and the Achaean towns on the Gulf of Corinth with close affiliation with Thessaly. Athens was well on her way

¹ Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

² Heraclitus, frs. 53, 80.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 69.

to a control of all Hellas. At this juncture came an opportunity to add to her spheres of influence the third of the great sources of food supply for Greece, Egypt. The other two, the Euxine region and Sicily, were already under her control. Egypt had revolted against Persia and to the rebels Athens sent aid. It proved to be too great an undertaking for the Egyptians and too much of a strain on the resources of Athens. The revolt failed and two Athenian fleets were destroyed. In the meantime efforts of Pericles in the Corinthian Gulf had not been altogether successful; Argos had made peace with Sparta, which left that city a free hand against Athens. Persia, too, was in a position to cause more trouble. The outcome was that Athens recalled Cimon from exile, obtained through his influence a five years' truce with Sparta, and sent him off on a final expedition against the Persians. On the island of Cyprus the Athenians won a victory over the Persians but Cimon died of disease during the campaign. Athens had exhausted her energies in these distant struggles; her forces were needed at home. There followed, then, as a natural result, negotiations with Persia. While no formal treaty was procurable, a verbal agreement was reached for the cessation of strife. This worked to the advantage of both parties in the trade that developed under the Athenians.

The forces which Athens had at her disposal were not equal to the task of unifying Hellas by force. Pericles tried to attain his goal, then, by peaceful means. He proposed a conference to meet at Athens, to consider measures for the rebuilding of the shrines destroyed by the Persians, the paying of the vows due to the gods, and "concerning the sea, that all might sail it fearlessly and keep the peace."¹ This attempt to put Hellas on a sound footing of religious

¹ Plutarch, trans. by Clough (New York, 1910), *Pericles* 17.

and commercial unity under the leadership of Athens was blocked by the watchful jealousy of Sparta. In 447 a crisis suddenly developed. A defeat of a small Athenian force at Coronea was followed by the revolt of all Boeotia and the continental federation collapsed. The next year a Spartan force invaded Attica and at the same time Megara and Euboea rebelled. Pericles managed to save the day; the Spartans withdrew and the Euboean revolt was suppressed, but Megara was lost. Athens, exhausted, was compelled to make peace on terms which restored in general the conditions existing prior to 461. Peace was made for thirty years, extending to the allies of both parties on the basis of the *status quo*. Athens thus abandoned all claim to her continental possessions except to Naupactus and Plataea. Her maritime empire, however, was acknowledged. Neither party was to interfere with the allies of the other but each might seek allies among neutrals. Hellas was thus divided into two fairly well-balanced parts. To keep the peace between them it was agreed that trade should be free to all, and furthermore that all disputes should be settled by arbitration, which by this time was regarded as an ancient custom. No provision was made, unfortunately, as to the means or methods to be employed in arranging for this judicial proceeding. It was left to the honor of the states concerned. Though the situation thus contained seeds of future strife, it appeared that for a time at least the problems of Hellas had been settled. In place of the domination of one power a balance had been established with measures intended to prevent its upset.

Pericles made use of the period of peace which followed to consolidate the Athenian Empire. Gradually her allies in the Delian Confederacy had been reduced to subjection until finally only Samos, Chios and Lesbos were left in a position of independence. The treasury was moved to

Athens after the disaster in Egypt; Athena became the protectress of the organization in place of Apollo; the Delian Congress fell into disuse, and the Athenian assembly settled measures relating to the empire. The empire was divided into tribute districts and quadrennial assessments were established, with provision for appeal to Athens. Legal cases of major importance were required to be sent to Athens for trial. Self-interest was the binding force which held the empire together. Freedom from foreign and domestic strife aided the development of trade and industry and produced prosperity. Athenian administration of legal matters assured justice to all and tended to legal assimilation. The Athenian policy of settling Athenian citizens at various places within the empire, while a source of grievance to the allies, was nevertheless a potent Atticizing force. The strongest element of union, however, was the maintenance of democracy in all the subject cities. The empire was an organization for the perpetuation of democracy.

With all its excellent purposes, however, this system contained fatal weaknesses. The exclusion of the allies from representation in the government produced a tendency to revolt. It violated the most precious principle of Hellenic political philosophy — the right of every state, no matter how small, to *eleutheria kai autonomia*, freedom and self-government. Oligarchs everywhere opposed the empire and sought its overthrow. In 440 a revolt broke out in Samos which was put down after considerable difficulty with a great deal of cruelty. Athens was still the master of the situation. The leader of the anti-imperialistic party in Athens itself had been ostracized shortly before. Corinth had prevented Peloponnesian interference in the Samian revolt for commercial reasons. No one seemed strong enough or willing to break down Athenian

power in the Ægean, and Pericles was able to devote time and money to the beautification and glorification of his city, to make it the cultural leader of Hellas.¹

The only writers of this golden age of Hellas who express any opinions on the subject of peace and war are the dramatist Sophocles (496-406 B. C.) and the historian Herodotus (ca. 484-425 B. C.). The former in his long life spanned the period of the rise and the fall of the power of his city. As a boy he took part in the celebrations over the victory of Salamis. The son of a wealthy manufacturer of munitions, he was able to devote himself to the pursuit of letters and to the service of the state, whose praises he sang so eloquently. Though of no great ability in public affairs, he was chosen as one of the generals in the Samian War, served a term as a treasurer of the empire, and in his old age acted as a commissioner to reorganize the empire after the defeat of the Sicilian expedition. He gained his highest glory as a finished master of the dramatic art. In enjoyment of a less troubled life and of a gentler spirit than his predecessor Æschylus, he was less inclined to solve the great problems of the life of man. In his more reasoned attitude towards the world, and above all in his devotion to the service of the state and its gods, he was closer to the people, a true interpreter of his period.²

To this easy-going, *eukolos*, as Aristophanes called him, gentleman of Athens, who received his support from the manufacture of arms, the problem of peace and war did not appeal; he offered no solution. Only occasionally do references to war appear in his dramas. When the subject did arise, however, he was vehement in his opposition. He condemned Ares, a blind monster who stirred up all evil

¹ This survey of the history of the period is based on Botsford's *Hellenic History* in manuscript, cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. iii.

² Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 216, *et seq.* Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

things.¹ On several occasions he pointed out the evil effects for the state, since war took the best of the young men and left the weaklings. "The well-born and the good Ares loves to snatch, while he who is bold in tongue, fleeing from danger, is free from harm, for Ares careth not for the coward."² The chorus of warriors in the *Ajax*, longing for the end of the long years of woe around Troy, recount their hardships and deprivations and curse the man who by his toils first taught the Greeks to league themselves for war in hateful arms. "Yea, he it was who wrought the ruin of men."³ In the *Trachiniae*, Deianeira expresses deep pity for those helpless and innocent sufferers, the women captives, so brutally treated and carried off into slavery, "ill-fated exiles, homeless and fatherless in a foreign land."⁴ Far better thought the poet that all wars should cease. He counseled prudence in the choice of war. To those who made war on behalf of suppliants, Zeus would give the victory, for it was an honorable thing, but useless war must be avoided.⁵ He pictured the joy at Thebes, the night-long dance and song, when the end of the trial of war had come and Thebes was safe from destruction.⁶ Yet this same dramatist was one of the generals who brought about the subjection and punishment of the revolting Samians.

Herodotus, born in Halicarnassus, exiled from his native city, a great traveler, was possessed of broad Panhellenic

¹ Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1917).

² Sophocles *Tragoediae*, ed. Dindorf-Mekler (Leipzig, 1912), *Philoctetes* 435-6; fr. 554, fr. 724.

³ *Id.*, *Ajax* 1185-1210.

⁴ *Id.*, *Trachiniae* 298-302.

⁵ *Id.*, *Oedipus Coloneus* 380, 1045-1098.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 119-126.

sympathies, somewhat colored by a predilection for Athens.¹ The historian of the Persian Wars and recorder of so many of the early wars of Hellas, he seldom expressed an opinion on the general subject of war. The Trojan war he regarded as without sufficient cause. Yet he felt that it lay at the beginning of all the later strife between Europe and Asia.² To war among the Greeks he objected. He praised the Athenians for yielding their right to command the fleet at the great congress at Corinth in order to avoid internecine struggle. "Herein they judged rightly. For internal strife is a thing as much worse than war carried on by a united people as war itself is worse than peace."³ In one short sentence he delivered a terrible condemnation of war. "Since in war fathers bury their sons, while in peace sons bury their fathers, no one is so senseless as to choose war in place of peace."³

¹ Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, *et seq.*

² Herodotus i, 3, 4.

³ *Id.*, viii, 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The Thirty Years' Peace put an end to open hostilities between Athens and Sparta, but it failed to settle the fundamental and vexing questions of rivalry and to remove the mutual bad feeling and distrust. The balance was too delicate. To avoid giving Sparta any occasion for opposition, Pericles departed from his earlier aggressive policy to one of conservation and consolidation. The first step in the direction of aggrandizement was certain to be challenged. Events and the exigencies of Athenian trade and industry forced the leaders of Athens into such a step and trouble followed.

The Megarian decrees formed the first piece of renewed aggression on the part of Athens. A small, over-populated state, once of great commercial importance, Megara had sunk to the position of a second-rate industrial city. However, her farmers furnished vegetables and meat to the Athenian markets, and her wares, which were good, made her merchants strong competitors of the Athenian manufacturers and tradesmen. In response to local demands for protection the Athenian assembly passed a decree excluding the Megarians from the markets of the empire. The Athenians had resented the withdrawal of Megara from their federation and probably hoped to force the Megarians into subjection that they might regain the favorable position on the Gulf of Corinth. This decree meant financial ruin and starvation to the Megarians and served as a warning to any

other state of the Spartan alliance which might block the Athenians. It aroused much apprehension on the part of other commercial states, particularly of Corinth.¹

The Corcyraean episode added another element to Corinthian unrest at the increasing power of Athens. Corcyra, a colony of Corinth, but one of the few remaining independent naval powers, finding herself at war with Corinth, appealed to Athens for aid. They had cogent arguments—their navy, which would be a valuable addition to the Athenian fleet, and the control which they were able to exercise over the trade route to Sicily. In vain did the Corinthians argue that the true path of expediency is the path of right. Athenian refusal of the Corcyraean offer meant the strengthening of the only important naval rival of Athens and a loss of prestige to Athens itself if it yielded to the desires of Corinth. To avoid any infraction of the peace the Athenians concluded a defensive alliance with Corcyra. In the resulting war the Corinthians were worsted.² The enmity thus aroused between Athens and Corinth was increased by a minor difficulty at Potidaea.³

The crisis in Hellenic affairs and the test of the Thirty Years' Peace came when the Corinthians, fully aroused, invited the envoys of the Peloponnesian League to meet at Sparta to consider the situation.⁴ The grievances were submitted to the Spartan assembly. Thucydides made use of the situation to draw a comparison between the Spartans, conservative, reluctant to assume the aggressive and willing to take defensive action only when absolutely necessary,

¹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 515 *et seq.*, *cf.* Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age* (London, 1911), ch. iii. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vol. iv (Berlin, 1901), pp. 288 *et seq.*

² Thucydides, i, 33 *et seq.* Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 282.

³ Thucydides, i, 56.

⁴ Grundy, *op. cit.*, ch. xv.

and the Athenians, revolutionary, always on the alert to seize the advantage, ready to risk all to gain their ends. They were born, said the Corinthian ambassadors, neither to have peace themselves nor to allow it to other men.¹ The Corinthians made the veiled threat that if their plea met with no success they would turn elsewhere for aid. Sparta was in this way forced into action. Athenians present endeavored to prevent such a result. They recounted the glorious deeds of Athens in the past. They explained the establishment of their empire and justified it on the ground of necessity. They pointed out the risks involved in war and called upon the Spartans to submit the disputes to arbitration according to the treaty.²

Archidamus, the conservative king of Sparta, counseled delay. He supported the Athenian demand for arbitration, pointing out the absence of a real cause, the superiority of the Athenians in the materials of war and in money, and the uncertainty of the issue.³ The war party, however, was the stronger. They realized that the basic issue was not the immediate charges against Athens but the existence of the Athenian empire itself, which was not a debatable question. "Let no one tell us that we should take time to think when we are suffering injustice," said the Ephor. "Lacedaemonians, prepare for war, as the honor of Sparta demands."⁴ It was voted, then, that the Athenians were guilty of an infraction of the treaty.⁵

At the assembly of the league which followed at Sparta the keynote of the war was sounded. Athens was a menace

¹ Thucydides i, 68 *et seq.*

² *Id.*, i, 73 *et seq.*

³ *Id.*, i, 80 *et seq.*

⁴ *Id.*, i, 86.

⁵ *Id.*, i, 87.

to all. Some states she already ruled. If from a love of peace and ease the Peloponnesians failed to make war upon her, she would soon dominate the rest. It was a war to assure peace to all Hellenes. "We are fighting for the liberty of Hellas. On every ground we are right in going to war."¹ The argument was unassailable. The league voted for war. A series of minor demands were made upon Athens, followed by a peremptory order for the dissolution of the empire.²

The Athenians refused to yield. The least concession would be a confession of wrong-doing or of weakness. Pericles regarded the war as inevitable and felt that Athens was ready. Acting on his advice they made counter-propositions to Sparta, put the onus of blame for the beginning of the war upon that city by offering arbitration "upon fair terms according to the treaty, well aware that war was at hand, anxious for peace, but ready and willing to defend themselves."³

Arbitration had failed in its crucial test as a means for the settling of disputes. Had there been provision for a proper tribunal and regular procedure in the treaty the quarrel might not have been brought to a head. Such a body would have been difficult to secure. There was no state powerful enough to enforce its decisions on either party and at the same time sufficiently without prejudice to act as arbiter. The Delphic Amphictyony was too much in the control of the Peloponnesians to be impartial. Furthermore, public opinion did not support the appeal to a judicial decision. The enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate was left by the treaty to the honor and the religious scruples

¹ Thucydides i, 119 *et seq.*, 123.

² Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 294 *et seq.*

³ Thucydides i, 140 *et seq.*

of the contracting parties themselves. When the issue came it was found to be unarbitrable. The existence of the Athenian empire was not a debatable question. Spartan fear and Corinthian jealousy of Athenian expansion could not be submitted to a tribunal. Considerations of individual expediency founded on fear or ambition were more powerful than the most binding of sacred oaths.

All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict. Prodigies and prophecies abounded.¹ Enthusiasm was manifest on both sides. Outside of the Athenian empire the war was extremely popular and the Spartans were hailed as the liberators of Hellas. The Spartan youth were eager for the excitement of war.² Nor was this feeling confined to Sparta. The Athenian young men gladly exchanged soft cloaks and snow-white slippers, flowing ringlets, baths and oil, for the breastplate and the greaves, and dropped the games of the banquet for the greater game of war, to fight for gods and country as their fathers had fought before them.³ In the defence of the city all parties were united. In the *Children of Heracles*, written in 430, Euripides warned the hated Peloponnesian invaders that Athens would not brook dictation.

For in brave men's eyes
The honor that fears shame is more than life.⁴

He warned them of the power of Athens.

¹ Thucydides ii, 8.

² *Ibid.*

³ Hermippus fr. 2, ed. Meineke, *Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum* (Berlin, 1839-1857). Aristophanes, *Knights* 576 *et seq.*

⁴ Way, *Tragedies of Euripides* (London, 1912), *Children of Heracles*, 199 *et seq.*, cf. Decharne, *Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas* trans. by Loeb (London, 1905), p. 128 *et seq.*

Peace love I well but I warn thee,
 O tyrant, treacherous-souled,
 Though thou march to the gates of our hold,
 Not the crown of thy hopes shall adorn thee.
 Not for thine hand the war spear alone
 Nor the brass on the buckler hath shone!
 O thou that in battle delightest,
 Trouble not, trouble not with thy spear
 The one that the Graces make brightest
 Of cities:—but dread thou and forbear.¹

In the spring of 431 the Spartan king Archidamus prepared his forces for an invasion of Attica. Pericles countered by bringing all the Athenians within the Long Walls and thus avoided a decisive battle on land, while the fleet was ravaging the Peloponnesian coasts. The suffering among the Athenians, most of whom were small farmers unused to city life, was great, and their enmity toward Sparta was increased by the destruction of their crops and their olive orchards. The plague which ravaged Athens added to the general discomfort and brought the peace party temporarily into power. Pericles triumphed over their attacks, but the following year himself died of the disease. His place as leader of the people was taken by a new type of men, products of the people, like Cleon, the tanner, and Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker.²

The invasion of Attica in the year 427 Thucydides regarded as unusually severe.³ As a result the peace party gained new courage. The wealthier noble class had suffered particularly. They had lost their fair estates in the country, with all their houses and rich furniture; their pleasures were restricted in the city;⁴ the exigencies of

¹ Way, *op. cit.*, *Children of Heracles*, 371-380.

² Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 333 *et seq.* Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 307 *et seq.*

³ Thucydides iii, 26.

⁴ *Id.*, ii, 65.

war had led to the imposition of a property tax, which fell upon them with heavy weight;¹ and they were bitterly opposed to the new developments of the democracy. The center of their opposition was in the oligarchic clubs.² The small farmer, though his hatred of Sparta was so strong that he refused to support any movement for peace and demanded revenge for the destruction of his vineyards and orchards,³ had grown weary of the cramped and confused life in the city and was longing for the end of the war.⁴ Of these people, the comic poets, in particular Aristophanes, were the spokesmen. In the *Acharnians*, Aristophanes made a bitter attack on the war party. He treated the causes of the war as trivial,⁵ admitted and joined in the common hatred of the Spartans, but claimed that they were not to blame for the beginning of the war.⁶ He felt apparently that the basic issues could best be settled by an honorable and lasting peace. He held up to ridicule the professional warrior, whom he accused of prolonging the war that he might be chosen for commands and thus secure full pay.⁷ The disastrous effects of war on the Athenian farms, the evil results of the interference with trade, both for the Athenians, who were deprived of the many products of Boeotia and of Megara, and for the Megarians and Boeotians, whom he represented as in a condition of starvation, he contrasted with the manifold advantages of peaceful cultivation and commerce.⁸ In a most delightful way he

¹ Glover, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³ Arist. *Acharn.* 182 *et seq.*, 228 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 32 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 524 *et seq.*, 509 *et seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 513 *et seq.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 572 *et seq.*, 597. Croiset, *Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens*, trans. by Loeb (London, 1909), pp. 58 *et seq.*

⁸ Arist. *Acharn.* 623 *et seq.*

opposed to the pictures of the hardships of the soldier's life the picture of the man who has secured peace and may devote himself to the couch and soft cloaks, eat thrushes and choice meats, drink his wine and enjoy his pleasures.¹

Off to your duties my heroes bold,
Different truly the paths ye tread;
One to drink with wreaths on his head;
One to watch and shiver with cold,
Lonely the while his antagonist passes
The sweetest of hours with the sweetest of lasses.²

The man of peace returns from the banquet with head dizzy from wine and a song on his lips. The warrior comes back from his vigil wounded, dizzy-headed from a fall on the rocks, murmuring a prayer to the Healer.³ The play was an appeal to the farmers to support the movement for peace.

All of Hellas was in confusion as a result of the war. In most of the cities, factions had arisen. The democratic leaders were endeavoring to establish or to assure their power by appealing to the Athenians, and the leaders of the oligarchs to the Lacedaemonians. Party strife brought many terrible calamities; anarchy and violence, crime and perfidy were rife; religion and oaths were forgotten.⁴ The practices of war were hardened by the intensity of feeling. Sailors who fell into Spartan hands were killed forthwith and the Athenians retaliated in kind. When Plataea fell the Spartans put to death all the men who remained and sold the women and children into slavery with no softening of the ancient custom.⁵ After the defeat of the oligarchic revolt in Mytilene the Athenians, on the motion of Cleon, voted to

¹ Arist. *Acharn.* 1083 *et seq.*

² Rogers, *Aristophanes, Acharnians* (London, 1910), 1143 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 1190 *et seq.*

⁴ Thucydides iii, 82.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii, 67; iii, 68; cf. Glover, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

put all male citizens to death. They reconsidered this action, and on the ground of better policy killed only the most guilty.¹ Against the general policy of Cleon towards the allies as exemplified in this affair, and in a later increase of the tribute, the comic poets protested, Aristophanes in the *Babylonians*, for which he was unsuccessfully prosecuted,² and Eupolis in the *Poleis* in which he represented the cities as appearing in person and begging for relief.³

The capture of the Spartans at Pylos in 425 furnished an opportunity for peace. The Spartans offered peace, alliance and friendly relations. "Let us be reconciled and, choosing peace instead of war ourselves, let us give relief and rest to all the Hellenes." The credit for the peace would go to Athens.⁴ The peace party were hopeful, but the imperialistic element among the democracy, led by Cleon, had gained new hopes and the Spartan offer was rejected. The great disappointment was voiced by Euripides in a beautiful plaint:

Ah, Peace, exceeding rich and of the blessed gods most beautiful, how long dost thou delay. I fear that old age will overwhelm me with its burdens ere I see thee, graceful one, appearing with the beautifully dancing choruses and thy garland-loving festal processions. Come to the city, august Queen, and drive fearful tumult from our dwellings and strife that rages and makes merry with the sharpened steel.⁵

The following year Aristophanes, in his *Georgoi*, mimicked this plea, but in so doing expressed the longings of the Attic farmers.

O Peace, exceeding rich and ye O yoked oxen! When shall it be granted me to cease from war, to dig the ditch and then to

¹ Thucydides iii, 36 *et seq.*; cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 1030.

² Croiset, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 *et seq.*

³ Meineke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 140.

⁴ Thucydides iv, 20, 21.

⁵ Euripides, ed. Nauck, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1892-5), fr. 462.

rest and to drink new wine and consume the oily bread and cabbage.¹

Cleon was the subject of many sharp attacks. Thucydides charged that he favored war because in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent and his slanders less credible.² Aristophanes, in the *Knights*, accused him of preventing the peace, not that Athens might gain fresh glory but that while he kept the people crowded in the city he might hold them in dependence on him, that while the haze and the dust of war was obscuring his actions from view he might plunder the cities at will.³

Athenian forces were defeated in the following years at Delium and by Brasidas, the ablest of the Spartan generals, in the Chalcidice. The Athenians then attempted to secure peace, but without success. In the final battle at Amphipolis both Cleon and Brasidas were killed. The two chief obstacles to the making of terms were thus removed. The conservatives on both sides came into control and peace was agreed upon. The Spartan allies were dissatisfied, but they were overruled. The treaty, which is known as the Peace of Nicias, after the Athenian commander, provided for mutual restorations and peace for fifty years.⁴

Aristophanes burst forth into jubilations in a play called the *Peace*.⁵ He represented the farmers as rejoicing in the advent of peace. One Trygaeus has scaled Olympus to find the goddess Peace, only to be told by Hermes that the gods, disgusted with Hellas because of its failure to end the war, had buried Peace and determined to grind the cities to pieces in a huge mortar. With the death of Cleon and of

¹ Aristophanes, fr. 109.

² Thucydides v, 16.

³ Arist., *Knights* 790 et seq.

⁴ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 411 et seq. Thucydides v, 16, 17.

⁵ Croiset, *op. cit.*, pp. 110 et seq.

Brasidas their pestles had been lost,¹ however. Trygaeus hails this as a glorious opportunity and calls upon all Hellenes, farmers, merchants, artisans, craftsmen, aliens, islanders and all, to unite with him in the task of digging up Peace. The whole Hellenic nation throws away its ranks and squadrons to engage in the task, midst laughter and dancing. Only the Megarians, the dissatisfied ones, the Argives who have been gaining from both sides, the professional soldier who desires a commission, and the merchant who sells spears and shields, stand aside.² Hermes must be bribed to keep silent. After an effort Peace is brought into view. The cities are reconciled. The crest-maker and the sword-cutler and the spear-burnisher may despair, but the pitchfork-maker and the manufacturer of sickles rejoice. The farmers lay aside their arms and return to their fig trees and their farms. Peace smells of "harvests, banquets, festivals, flutes, thrushes, plays, the odes of Sophocles, Euripidean wordlets . . . the bleating lambs, the ivy-leaf, the vat, full-bosomed matrons . . . the tipsy maid, the drained and empty flask, and many another blessing."³

Think of all the thousand pleasures,
Comrades, which to Peace we owe,
All the life of ease and comfort
Which she gave us long ago:
Figs and olives, wines and myrtles,
Luscious fruits, preserved and dried,
Banks of fragrant violets, blowing
By the crystal fountain-side;
Scenes for which our hearts are yearning,
Joys that we have missed so long,
Comrades, here is Peace returning
Greet her back with dance and song.⁴

¹ Arist., *Peace* 204 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 301 *et seq.*, 441 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 434 *et seq.*, 529 *et seq.*, 545 *et seq.*, 1210 *et seq.*, trans. by Rogers (London, 1913).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 571 *et seq.*

The peace proved to be thoroughly unstable. The treaty could never be carried out in entirety without the consent of the Spartan allies who had refused to acquiesce in it. There were infractions on both sides. To minimize these the two cities concluded a defensive alliance, which however had no good feeling in its support. The war party led by the young and reckless Alcibiades came back into power at Athens. An alliance was made with Argos which involved Athens in a war in the Peloponnesus. The battle of Mantinea which followed caused the prestige of Sparta to rise and Athens was again isolated.¹

In 416 came the famous Melian episode. The little island of Melos, a Dorian settlement which was in an advantageous position for trade with Egypt, had refused to join the Athenian Empire. The Athenians decided to compel it to submit. Military expediency alone controlled the situation. Justice and honor involved danger in practice. The Melians refused to surrender, but were overwhelmed. All who were of military age were put to death and the rest sold into slavery.² It was the greatest blot on the name of Athens, one which Athenian orators in the next century endeavored in vain to explain away. It is thought by some that Euripides' powerful play, the *Troades*, was written as a protest against this action.³

The restless imperialistic leaders soon involved the city in the Sicilian expedition which resulted so disastrously and brought a renewal of the war in Greece. From that time on the war dragged along with varying success, with many useless attempts to secure peace by both sides. The oligarchs made their effort to secure control of Athens and

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 465 *et seq.*

² Thucydides v, 85 *et seq.*, *cf.* Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

³ Glover, *op. cit.*, pp. 157 *et seq.*

peace with Sparta, but were overthrown. Finally, after Persia had been drawn into the struggle, Lysander, the new Spartan leader, won the battle of Ægospotami. Athens fell, the Long Walls were pulled down to the music of flutes, and Hellas was free.¹

Throughout the period Aristophanes was the great proponent of peace. He did not agree with the man who declared that the gods had willed that wars should never cease until the wolf and the lamb were united,² but he worked through his plays to secure perpetual peace for Hellas. In the *Acharnians* he compared the hardships and the alarms of war with the happiness of peace. The *Peace* was full of the jubilation of the farmers when they were allowed to return to their country homes without fear of the invaders. In the *Lysistrata*, a later play, he wrote of the sufferings of the women whose husbands and sons were always away at the wars and of the unmarried girl whose chances for happiness were thus destroyed.³

The responsibility for the war the poet laid upon the leaders. He recognized the righteous wrath of the farmers at the destruction of their fields and admitted equal hatred of Sparta. But he declared that the Spartan people were not to blame and should not be compelled to suffer for the evil machinations of the rulers.⁴ He accused as perpetuators of war the demagogues who were seeking position, power and graft, the professional soldier, the manufacturers of munitions, all who pretended that they were seeking the best interests of the state while they were actually pursuing personal gain.⁵ In the final analysis the cause of

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 550 *et seq.*

² Arist., *Peace* 1075, 6.

³ Arist., *Lysistrata*, 99 *et seq.*, 585 *et seq.*

⁴ *Vide supra*, p. 93; *Peace* 627 *et seq.*

⁵ *Vide supra*, p. 93; *cf.* Croiset, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 *et seq.*

war was the desire for money. In the *Lysistrata*, the women of all the states who had combined to establish peace, seized the treasury, thus to remove the possibility of gain and to compel the men to make peace.¹

In his general attitude Aristophanes was thoroughly Panhellenic. He did not hesitate to speak his mind for the hated Spartans. All his efforts were for Hellas rather than for Athens alone.² So *Lysistrata*, in her endeavors to secure peace and friendship on the basis of the common sisterhood of all women, rebuked the Athenians and the Spartans for their fighting and bickering,³ and called them to unity in the name of religion and brotherhood.

And now, dear friends, I wish to chide you both,
That ye, all of one blood, all brethren sprinkling
The selfsame altars from the selfsame laver,
At Pylae, Pytho, and Olympia, ay
And many others which 'twere long to name,
That ye, Hellenes—with barbarian foes
Armed, looking on—fight and destroy Hellenes!⁴

In the poet's dream of peace the reconciled cities greet and blend in peaceful intercourse and laugh for joy.⁵

Thucydides, the Athenian, wrote the history of the war. He began to write at its very beginning, because he felt that it was going to be great and memorable above all other wars.⁶ His own part in the war ended with his exile after a defeat in Thrace for which as general he was held responsible, and he was able to devote himself to the gathering of his materials. Though he had been himself a general, was the historian of a war and wrote his history as a text-book

¹ Arist., *Lysis*. 487 et seq.

² Arist., *Peace* 302 et al.

³ *Id.*, *Lysis*. 1159 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1128 et seq.

⁵ *Id.*, *Peace* 538 et seq.

⁶ Thucydides i, 1.

for later statesmen and generals, he was by no means a supporter of war. He regarded this war as inevitable. But he pointed out the many calamities which it had brought to Hellas: the capture and depopulation of cities, the exiles and the slaughter, and especially the debasement of character, both of cities and of men.

In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life is a hard master and tends to assimilate men's character to their conditions.¹

He knew, too, how to draw a picture of the hardships of war when he wrote of the sufferings of the Athenians after the plague and of the terrors of the retreat from Syracuse.

Besides the reasoning which showed that the conflict between Athens and Sparta was necessary and inevitable, many arguments against war in general appear in the speeches which Thucydides composed to represent the positions of the various parties. Again and again was emphasized the fact that war was a matter of chance, hazardous to both sides, that men began with blows and then when defeated had recourse to words, though the exercise of prudence would have restrained them in the beginning.² The sufferings of the state in the loss of its men was held to be greater than in the loss of property. "Mourn not for houses and for lands," said Pericles, "but for men. For houses and lands men may gain, but they will not gain men."³ Upon the men so lost, the state and its leaders bestowed the highest honors.⁴

The clearest statement of the whole problem of peace and

¹ Thuc. iii, 82.

² *Id.*, i, 81; iv, 20, 62.

³ *Id.*, i, 143.

⁴ *Id.*, ii, 46.

war was in the speech ascribed to Hermocrates the Syracusan. The Sicilians held a congress in 424 B. C. to endeavor to secure peace among themselves. Hermocrates, who had brought about the meeting, presented in no mincing words the situation in Sicily.

You well know and therefore I shall not rehearse to you at length, all the misery of war. Nobody is compelled to go to war by ignorance and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear. The truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked would sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest immediate loss. But when such feelings on the part of either operate unseasonably the time for offering counsel of peace has arrived, and such counsels if we will only listen to them will be at this moment invaluable to us. Why did we go to war? Simply from a consideration of our own individual interests, and with a view to our interests we are now trying by means of discussion to obtain peace; and if, after all, we do not before we separate succeed in getting our respective rights, we shall go to war again.

He pointed out the threatening danger of Athenian domination. "The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable enough. I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are willing to serve." The justice of a cause, he held to be no sufficient guarantee of success.

The revenge of a wrong is not always successful merely because it is just; nor is strength most assured of victory when it is most full of hope. The inscrutable future is the controller of events and being the most treacherous of all things is the most beneficent, for where there is mutual fear, men think twice before they make aggressions upon one another.

Then he appealed for peace,

And why if peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of blessings, should we not make peace among ourselves? Whatever of good or evil is the portion of any of us, is not peace more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate the other? And has not peace honors and glories of her own unattended by the dangers of war? (But it is unnecessary to dilate on the blessings of peace any more than on the miseries of war.) Consider what I am saying, and instead of despising my words, may every man seek his safety in them.¹

Euripides, born in the year of Salamis, educated during the days when Athens was becoming the prytaneum of Greek wisdom as well as the leader of Greek politics, had reached the prime of his manhood at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. He was intensely interested in things human, in the solution of the problems of human relations, by contrast with his predecessors who dealt with the great problems of the universe. Sophocles had treated peace and war as an academic question. To Euripides they appealed as vital elements in the relationships of men.²

He was essentially a lover of peace, whom he hailed as the richest and most beautiful of the goddesses, nurse of fair children and the giver of happiness and wealth.³ Yet he was carried away by hatred of Sparta into advocacy of the war. The *Andromache*, which concerned the mistreatment of the Trojan princess by Menelaus and Hermione, consisted chiefly of a bitter attack on that city. He called the Spartans princes of lies, weavers of webs of guile, covetous murderers, the vilest of men, the most immoral of women, and, except for their martial fame, the meanest of

¹ Jowett, *Thucydides* (London, 1883), iv, 59 *et seq.*

² Cf. Decharne, *op. cit.*, pp. 128 *et seq.*; Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³ Euripides, *Suppliants*, 489-491; *Bacchantes*, 419-420; *Orestes*, 1682 *et seq.*

mankind.¹ In an argument concerning the causes of the Trojan war in the same play, he put into the mouth of the braggart captain, Menelaus, one of the chief arguments for war. Menelaus claimed that, if Helen were responsible for the war, she had nevertheless wrought a great boon for Hellas: "For those who were ignorant of arms and battles turned them to manly deeds. Fellowship in the fight is the great teacher of all things to men."²

The poet reproached the gods for their part in bringing on the strife. He repeated the old epic argument that Zeus had caused the war to relieve mother earth of her troublous throng of men, to bring glory to the mightiest son of Hellas, to ruin Troy and punish Greece.³

In his other writings Euripides made it clear that he was never for peace at any price. He felt the danger in the use of intelligence without courage as in boldness mixed with folly, though the former might bring peace and the latter keep off foes.⁴ He despised the youth who hated to play the man in war.⁵ Those who had died with honor, a crown of glory to their city, he regarded as more alive than they who lived with dishonor.⁶ Some of his finest characters were among those like Menoeceus, son of Creon, and Iphigeneia, who were willing to give up their lives that the fatherland might live.⁷ Praxithea, wife of Erechtheus, prayed that her sons might be such as would win renown among men in war, not by vain outward show within the walls.⁸ The poet's ideal citizen was like Parthenopaeus,

¹ Euripides, *Andromache* 445 *et seq.*; 724 *et seq.*

² *Id.*, *Andromache* 681-4.

³ *Id.*, *Helen* 38-41; fr. 1067.

⁴ *Id.*, fr. 556.

⁵ *Id.*, fr. 1039.

⁶ *Id.*, *Troades* 400 *et seq.*; fr. 363.

⁷ *Id.*, *Phoenissae* 995 *et seq.*; *Iphigeneia in Aulis* 1378 *et seq.*

⁸ *Id.*, fr. 364.

who though Arcadian, stood midst the spears of the Argive host like an Argive born, fought for the land, rejoiced when the city prospered and grieved when things went ill.¹

Nevertheless, he inveighed against useless war and counseled prudence, the choice of discretion as the better part of valor.² He praised the wise man who by justice and by good advice took away battles and civil uprisings from Greece.³ He attacked the young men who to win praise or to obtain power or gold for themselves drove the leaders of the state on to war and considered not the sufferings of the people thus misused.⁴ For warrior glory of itself he had no liking. Thousands of humble lives were sacrificed, he felt, that a general might erect a trophy.⁵ He regarded ambition as the greatest curse of men.⁶ Every man realized how much better peace was for mankind than war. Yet with ambition before their eyes they had chosen war, and had strained the bow to shoot beyond the mark.⁷ In its train followed injustice, man had enslaved man and city had overthrown city. In the end men had yielded to stern facts.⁸

Madmen, all ye who seek advantages in war, fighting with mighty spears, seeking senselessly to lay aside the burdens of life. If struggles of blood be ever judge of peace, then never shall strife withdraw from the cities of men.⁹

¹ Euripides, *Suppliants* 896-8.

² *Id.*, *Suppliants* 506-510, 161-2.

³ *Id.*, fr. 284, 23-28.

⁴ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 229-37, 160.

⁵ *Id.*, *Andromache* 694 *et seq.*

⁶ *Id.*, *Phoenissae* 531-4, 812.

⁷ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 479 *et seq.*, 743 *et seq.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 493 *et seq.*

⁹ *Id.*, *Helen* 1151-7.

If men considered death for themselves when they voted for war, then never would they cast their vote and Hellas would not be dashed to ruin.¹ Reason could accomplish all that the sword could bring to pass, and this Euripides proposed as the solution of the problem.² He drew a remarkable picture of self-restraint in the *Suppliants*. Here Theseus is represented as having gone to Thebes to compel the burial of the dead chieftains. This done, he refused to pursue the conquest further and returned home.³

In the scenes of battle the poet was not impressed by the glorious martial strife, the thunder and ring of mailed Ares, but saw only destruction, ruin and sorrow. Above the clash of shields he heard the groan and shriek of the dying and saw on the field the shattered chariots, the rivers of gore and the heaps of corpses.⁴

On many occasions, especially in the *Hecuba* and the *Troades*, Euripides wrote of the sufferings occasioned by war, the grief of the grey-haired women and aged men both among the victorious Hellenes and the conquered Trojans, who were deprived of their sons, and the terrible lot of the younger women of Troy, many of whom saw their husbands slain, their children torn from their arms and dashed to death upon the ground and who were themselves dragged into slavery to suffer fresh outrages at the hands of the Greeks.⁵

Euripides echoed the thought of Sophocles and made the application more direct, when he declared that war took

¹ Euripides, *Suppliants* 481-5.

² *Id.*, *Phoenissae* 515 et seq. *Suppliants* 747 et seq.

³ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 724 et seq.

⁴ *Id.*, *Children of Heracles* 832 et seq. *Phoenissae* 1192 et seq. *Suppliants* 684 et seq.

⁵ *Id.*, *Troades* 371 et seq., 562 et seq., et al.; *Hecuba* 473 et seq., 154 et seq., et al.; *Andromache* 106 et seq., et al.

the most excellent men, the valiant youths, and left the coward. To the city this is a calamity for the noblest to die;¹ and a loss, he said, that can never be replaced. "For the one loss that mortal may never make good again is this, the life of man, though wealth may be rewon."² Surely, he who would bring war upon the state will hesitate when he considers the sorrow and desolation which will follow.³ So Euripides exhorted his countrymen.

O miserable mortals, why do yet get yourselves spears and deal out death upon each other? Stop and withdraw from these toils. Peaceful, 'mid the peaceful, guard your towns. Short is your span of life. Best then to pass through it as gently as may be, not worn by burdens.⁴

Thus the difficulties of the fifth century, on the one hand, and the advancing ease and luxury and culture of life on the other, had led the writers of the period to condemn war and to cry for peace. Among the people who had suffered so many hardships there had come, too, a realization of the advantages of peace and a longing for it. Arbitration had failed to accomplish it. But the end of the century saw the downfall of the tyrant city that had threatened all Hellas. Surely the people might look forward to a long period of happy independence.

¹ Euripides, fr. 728.

² *Id.*, *Suppliants* 745.

³ *Id.*, *Children of Heracles* 161 *et seq.*; *Suppliants* 591.

⁴ *Id.*, *Suppliants* 949-954.

CHAPTER V

THE FOURTH CENTURY

THE opening events of the fourth century proved that the Peloponnesian war, which was to accomplish so much for the peace of Hellas, had actually settled nothing. Sparta feared too much the growing power of Thebes as well as the condemnation of all Hellenes to allow Athens to be destroyed. Athens was crippled but not beyond repair. Ere long, with Persian help, she rose afresh, became once more a rival of Sparta, and even hoped for a renewal of her former greatness and empire. The tyranny of the Thirty was overthrown and there was no further hope of establishing an oligarchy in Athens. She remained a democracy and the rallying point for all democratic cities and for all democratic parties in cities against oligarchic Sparta. No real attempt had been made to lessen the differences which held them apart. Nor had their hatred and distrust of each other grown any the less.¹

To complicate matters a new power had arisen. Thebes had grown strong on the misfortunes of Athens. Her population had been increased by refugees, her wealth had been magnified greatly by plunder and her control over the Boeotian League had been strengthened.² On the outside stood the Persian king and his satraps. They were interested in keeping any Hellenic power from becoming too

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 1, *et seq.*

² Oxyrhynchus *Hellenica*, xii, in Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

strong and in regaining control over the Asiatic cities. Once this were accomplished, it would be to the interest of Persian trade to have peace in the Ægean. The wealth of the Persian Empire, for which both sides among the warring Hellenes bargained, gave it a dominating influence in Hellenic affairs.

The gift of freedom to Hellas by the Spartans proved to be a delusion. The small states had but exchanged masters. Spartan military hegemony interposed its iron hand in place of Athenian control. Lysander, anxious to secure power and glory for himself as well as for Sparta, saw to it that Spartan influence was established among the former allies of Athens. The democratic leaders who were favorable to Athens were driven out and boards of ten men were put into control of the states. With such bodies Sparta knew how to deal. To keep them in power Lacedæmonian garrisons under harmosts were placed in the cities. The result was "plunder, oppression and murder." Spartan power was based on military force, and therefore required military force to maintain it. It would endure only so long as Sparta was supreme on land and sea. Meanwhile her enemies were increasing. Everywhere the exiles were planning revenge and the populace was becoming restive. With the decline of the power of Lysander the decarchies fell, but the hatred and fear of Sparta did not decrease. Thebes and Corinth, who had borne their share of the war against Athens, felt that they had been deprived of their share of the rewards. Spartan ambition frightened them and they refused to follow Sparta's lead.¹

The war with Persia which followed the march of the Ten Thousand gave to Sparta an opportunity to unite the Greeks in a great Panhellenic movement. Allies in Thessaly

¹ Botsford, *Hellenic History*, ch. xxi.

had already been secured in the formation of an Hellenic league. Agesilaus planned to follow in the steps of Agamemnon and led his forces to Aulis for a sacrifice. He misused his powers and alienated his allies by the gift of appointments to his friends. Other Greeks refused to join and Thebes was openly hostile. Theban cavalry scattered his men at the sacrifice. Though all chance of a Panhellenic army was gone, Agesilaus proceeded to Asia Minor, and there was making considerable headway against Persia when events in Greece called him home.¹

The enemies of Sparta had found common cause and had united to wage war once again for the freedom of Hellas. Athens, Thebes, Corinth, Argos and many of the islands formed a league, and in 395 the Corinthian war began. Though it seemed to put an end to all Panhellenic hopes, Gorgias² and Lysias,³ the orators, urged the Greeks to lay aside these local differences and unite for a great war with Persia. One event made this impossible. In 393 Conon, an Athenian, admiral of the Persian fleet, won a victory off Cnidus which destroyed Spartan naval supremacy, and then with Persian money aided in the rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens. Persia knew well how to prevent united action among the Greeks. Athens, once again able to lift her head and hope for a renewal of wealth and empire, began the formation of a new league among the islanders and refused to follow the lead of Sparta.⁴

In spite of her naval defeat Sparta was still supreme on land. The Boeotians were discouraged and an attempt was

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 204 *et seq.*; Xenophon, ed. Marchant 3 vols. (Oxford, 1900), *Hellenica* vii, 1, 3, 4.

² Philostratus, *Vita Sophistarum* ed. Kayser (Leipzig, 1870-1), 9, 2.

³ Lysias, ed. Heide, Oxford 1913 *Olympiakos*; cf. Jebb, *Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (2nd ed., London, 1893), vol. i, p. 155.

⁴ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 238 *et seq.*

made in the winter of 392-1 to secure peace. Sparta announced that she was willing to grant freedom to all the Greeks, common use of the seas, and to allow the maintenance of the Athenian fleet and walls.¹ But the old Athenian war party was in control. They talked of the dangers to the democracy if peace were made before Sparta was crushed, of the losses that might follow, and they held out hopes of the recovery of the lost lands and property on the Chersonese in the event of victory. Andocides, the orator, endeavored to break down the opposition to peace. He pointed out that neither their allies nor the Great King would allow the fruition of the dreams of regained power. He reminded them that the democracy had been disturbed only when Athens was crushed; that Athens had prospered and gained her power during the intervals of peace with Sparta, and had suffered and lost in every war that she had waged with that city. For the crushing of Sparta he held that Athens had neither the men nor the arms nor the money. "That to enter upon a just and fair peace is much wiser than to carry on war you all seem to understand clearly, Athenians."² Peace could not be secured, however. The following year the Athenian general Iphicrates won a victory on land. The tide began to turn against Sparta and she appealed to Persia. To have Sparta crushed was not to the interest of the Great King. In addition, the Lacedaemonians were willing to pay his price for support. Once his financial aid was withdrawn from Athens and her allies, they could do naught but accept his terms. A conference met at Sardis, of which this proclamation was the outcome:

King Artaxerxes deems it right that the cities of Asia with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to himself.

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 251, 2.

² Andocides ed. Blass (Leipzig, 1906), *On the Peace*.

The remaining cities, small and great, he wishes to leave independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three as formerly are to belong to Athens. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, together with those who share my views, will wage war against him or them by land and sea, with ships and with money.¹

To the familiar terms of *eleutheria kai autonomia*, a new principle had been added—the armed enforcement of peace. With the exception of the shameful surrender of the Asiatic cities, the peace seemed eminently fair and just. In fact, it brought untold confusion. The Athenian maritime alliance was broken up and the naval power of Athens was so shattered that pirates once more ruled the seas. The Boeotian League was disbanded and with it went the hopes of Thebes. Only Sparta remained the gainer. The principles of armed force for which she stood had been vindicated in fact if not in word. It was generally understood that she was to enforce the peace with Persian backing.² Her power in the Peloponnesus was not injured and there were none that might gainsay her, none to protect the weaker states nor the peace itself against her. Autonomy was easily translated to mean the rule of the friends of Sparta.³ Decarchies were once again set up and there followed a new series of revolutions. Exiles again wandered in armed mercenary bands and menaced life and property throughout the land. More cities were taken during the period of the peace than before it had been concluded.⁴

Sparta herself broke the peace. To punish Mantinea for

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica* v, 1, 31; cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 267 *et seq.*

² Botsford, *Hellenic History*, ch. xxi.

³ Cf. Glover, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁴ Isocrates, ed. Blass, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1885), *Peace*.

disaffection she crushed and destroyed that city.¹ Then a Spartan commander without justification seized the citadel of Thebes. When he was tried at Sparta for his infraction of the peace, Agesilaus defended him on the ground that he had acted for the best interests of the state and he escaped with a fine. The citadel was kept.²

To the north a group of states were offering a new solution to the problem of peace and unity. Olynthus in the Chalcidice had become the center of a federal union. Citizens in each state of the league were given full rights of citizenship in every other state and thus were held together by a common interest. Even those who had been forced into the organization soon lost their local interests in the welfare of the whole. Its growing power was regarded as a menace by its neighbors and by the Spartans. Federalism had no place in a world ruled by Sparta. When the Olynthian union had been destroyed by a short war, Spartan power had reached its climax. Agesilaus had attained the goal of his desires.

The man who led his city to these achievements was Agesilaus, the embodiment of the Lacedaemonian spirit, patriotic, ambitious and efficient, but with stunted ideals, unprogressive alike in military art, in statesmanship and in humanism—a man who tested the right or wrong of every action by the sole advantage of Sparta, whose vision, limited to brute power, took no account of the moral forces roused through Hellas by his policy of blood and iron.³

The armed forces of Athens and Thebes, supported by these moral forces of disappointment and indignation, were preparing to crush the power of Sparta, to punish her for

¹ Diodorus Siculus xv, 1.

² Xenophon, *Hellenica*, v, 2, 25 *et seq.*

³ Botsford, *Hellenic History*, ch. xxi.

her breach of the peace and to compel her to allow the Hellenes to live in peace, free and secure. Athens had been busy in the formation of a new confederacy. Alliances with Chios, Byzantium and Chalcis were secured, and in 377 the second Athenian Confederacy was launched, with the support of the maritime states.¹ In this Athens had been careful to keep the peace. No one was forced to come in; each treaty provided for local freedom and autonomy. The assembly of the allies met free from Athenian interference and only required Athenian sanction for action. No tribute was collected, but ships and money were to be contributed when needed. The purpose of the league was defence against Sparta.

Thebes meanwhile had been able to drive the Spartan garrison out of the citadel and to reorganize the Boeotian League.² In alliance with Athens accordingly she declared war upon Sparta for the freedom of Hellas.³ Though the allies outmatched Sparta in strength, they were unable to make headway. Thebes left the prosecution of the war to Athens and turned to increasing her own power at the cost of the very principles of liberty and law for which she had gone to war. Thespieae was subjugated, Plataea was destroyed again, and the conquest of Phocis was started.⁴ Athens became alarmed and turned to Sparta. In 374 a peace conference at Sparta reaffirmed the principles of the King's Peace. But the difficulties had not been settled. The democratic party in a small state appealed for help,

¹ Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 14 *et seq.*

² On the organization of this confederacy *cf.* Botsford, "The Constitution and Politics of the Boeotian League," in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxv (1910), pp. 271-296.

³ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 381.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 390 *et seq.*

and Timotheus, the Athenian admiral, gave it. Elsewhere the same consequences followed. Sparta continued to establish oligarchies and Athens to aid democracies and the war continued.¹ To put an end to this, to check the advancing power of Thebes and to bring an end to hostilities a congress was called to meet in Sparta in 371.² Here was represented all Hellas, and Persia as well, in an attempt to secure a general peace. Though men felt that it was impossible to put an end to all wars, they sought a way to prevent the disputes which were the most prolific causes of strife. It was recognized that the chief difficulty lay in the governmental differences between Athens and Sparta. In every small state in Greece the democratic party looked to Athens for support and the oligarchic to Sparta. Alliances followed the will of the party in power. Party strife led to appeals on both sides, and these involved the two leading states in war with each other. It was agreed that the only solution lay in open friendship between the two powers and an agreement not to interfere in such local disputes. To compass such a state of affairs, the peace provided that all governors should be withdrawn, each state should be left free to choose its own form of government and its own alliances, and armaments should be disbanded, both naval and military. Furthermore, "if any state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while conversely, to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will."³ The last provision proved to be the weak link in the chain.

The success of the plan involved the end of the growing power of Thebes. Athens and Sparta would allow no rival.

¹ Diodorus xv, 4. Xen., *Hell.* vi, 2.

² Xen., *Hell.* vi, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, vi, 3, 20.

Epaminondas, the Theban representative, was ordered by the congress to sign for Thebes only and to allow the other Boeotians to sign for themselves. This meant the end of the Boeotian League. Rather than yield to what they regarded as virtual destruction, the Thebans withdrew from the conference and their state was excluded from the treaty.¹ Sparta thereupon took up the burden of enforcing the peace against Thebes.² One Spartan opposed this action before the assembly and made a remarkable suggestion. He proposed that the army should be recalled and disbanded according to the treaty; that contributions should then be placed at Delphi;

then, if any one violated the peace or the independence of the states, all others could be invited in and funds would be at hand. The sanction of heaven and the enforcement of the peace would thus be secured with the least annoyance to the states. But the assembly on hearing these words agreed that this man was talking nonsense.³

The Spartan army advanced against Thebes unsupported by Athens. Leuctra followed, and with it came the collapse of Spartan supremacy and the end of all the bright hopes of the peace conference. Every state remembered its long years of oppression and broke loose from Sparta. Athens, in spite of her recent pledge and the mutual obligation for the war against Thebes, made use of the situation to increase her own powers. She gathered around herself a group of the smaller cities, held a conference and secured peace among them with a pledge to protect them in case of need.⁴ Thebes followed up her victory by an invasion of

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, vii, 1 *et seq.*

² Diodorus xv, 6.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, vi, 4, 2. Trans. by Dakyns, 3 vols. (New York, 1890-97).

⁴ *Ibid.*, vi, 5, 1 *et seq.*

the Peloponnesus. The old alliance was broken up, Messene was rebuilt and a league was formed among the Arcadians to act as a check on Sparta.¹ Not until Theban power became threatening did Athens remember her oaths and engage in the war in defence of the peace.²

The army of Thebes was not strong enough to secure her position, so she in turn called a series of meetings, with the aid of Persia, whose trade was suffering from the prolongation of hostilities. Meetings were held at Delphi and at Susa, which attempted to destroy Athenian naval power and to secure recognition of Theban leadership, but they resulted only in contempt for the Great King. A seventh meeting, this time at Thebes, resulted in the acceptance by many smaller states of the usual terms of freedom and autonomy. They refused, however, to take any oath which would bind them to Thebes. It is probable that the Thebans proposed an alliance to compel Sparta to accept the peace and recognize Messene. This the other states declined.³ The final effort of the Thebans to secure control and of the other states to defend themselves came at Mantinea. Though a Theban victory, it resulted in the death of Epaminondas and the end of the power of his city.⁴

No one state stood out in the general chaos strong enough to dominate. A balance of power more stable it was thought than that between Athens and Sparta had been established. All save Sparta united and a common peace was made, "so that putting aside the war against each other, each shall make his own city as great and prosperous as possible, and

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 449 *et seq.*

² Xen. *Hell.* vii, 1; *cf.* Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum graecorum* (3d ed., Leipzig, 1915), 159.

³ Xen. *Hell.* vii, 1, 27, 33 *et seq.*, 39 *et seq.*; *cf.* Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 430.

⁴ Xen., *Hell.*, vii, 5, 25.

shall remain useful to friends and strong." An offer to unite with revolting satraps against Persia was refused. If the Great King did not interfere with them, they would not make war on him.¹

The hope for peace was vain. A quarrel between Thebes and Phocis, which had not been settled, led to strife, which was easily turned into a Sacred War by the Thebans. Athens and Sparta went to the aid of the Phocians, and the Thebans called in Philip of Macedon. With his entrance a new element appeared in Hellenic history.

In the meantime the second Athenian Confederacy, from which so much had been expected, had fallen on difficult times. The Athenians had departed from their lofty resolves, had failed to protect the allies properly and had spent the money of the league for their own purposes. Some of the states had been reduced to subjection and others had been plundered by the mercenary soldiers which were hired to defend them. Epaminondas had stirred up discontent among the allies, and in 357 several of the islands, led by Chios, Rhodes and the city of Byzantium, and supported by Mausolus of Caria, revolted. Persia interfered, and the Athenians were compelled to recognize the independence of the seceders. There were some who opposed the peace in the hope of regaining what had been lost, but sound counsels of finance and polity prevailed and peace was made. Within a year the confederacy had collapsed entirely. Thus because of the short-sighted, self-seeking policy of Athens the last experiment in Hellenic unification during the days of Greek freedom had failed.² All the powers had passed—Athenian, Spartan, Olynthian, Theban, and Athenian again. There was no power strong

¹ Dittenberger, 182. Diodorus, xv, 10.

² Marshall, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 *et seq.*

enough to lead, no city willing enough to follow. When peace and unity came to the Hellenic world, it was compelled from without.

To the north, in the valley above modern Saloniki, lay Pella, capital of the kingdom of Macedon. Its kings had been in close relations with Athens for a century. In the early part of the fourth century before the Christian era, the throne had been seized by Philip. He possessed a genius for organization, remarkable foresight, a shrewd mind, but an unscrupulous character. The greatest general Greece had produced had been his tutor in military science. He had acquired the throne by violence and he knew his own powers and the absolute nature of his rule. In early life he had learned what the weaknesses of Greece were and how they might be used to his advantage. It became his ambition to raise himself with his little kingdom, despised as barbarian by the cultured Greeks of the south, to a controlling place in the Greek world.¹

Philip's first task was the organization of his own kingdom. All opposition was crushed. Every man subject to him was trained in the newest methods of warfare. Supplies of money and munitions were gathered and the entire nation was placed on a war basis. The citizen armies of the Greek states had been accustomed to fighting only in dull seasons. To the armies that Philip organized, seasons made no difference; they were ready to fight at any time, in any place, under any conditions.²

The problem of foreign relations was solved with the same efficiency. Measures were taken to secure friends and

¹ Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom* (London, 1914), pp. 143 *et seq.*

² Demosthenes, ed. Dindorff, rev. by Blass, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1891-1907), trans. by Kennedy, C. R., 5 vols. (London, 1903), *Phil.* iii, 49, *Ol.* i, 4.

prevent a coalition of Greeks against him. Gold was disbursed freely among the venal to obtain support. For some, the flattery of friendship sufficed. Others were gained by promises of support in local politics or petty wars. Exhibitions of his power won the fearful. Before the final conflict began there was a strong Macedonian party in every city of Greece and some cities had declared themselves his friends.¹

Philip was entirely without scruple. The old rules of warfare did not bind him. Treaties and truces he broke whenever his purposes required. Frequently he avowed friendship for a city and promised support and alliance. Once a foothold was secured in this way, he forgot his promises and the city fell. Captured, it might expect no mercy. The surrounding country was devastated, the city destroyed, its men killed or sold into slavery, while its women, too often, suffered a worse fate. In the neighborhood a colony of Macedonians was settled to secure the region.² Spies in Philip's employ were everywhere. One Athenian was executed for accepting his bribe to burn an arsenal in Athens.³

Two things were needed to establish his place in the sun of the Ægean world: recognition by the Greek states as a leading power in order that he might dominate their councils, and the stretch of seacoast reaching from Saloniki to Byzantium—modern Constantinople—to secure for him the rich gold mines of Thrace, but above all to give him a vantage point from which he might outrival and crush the commercial and naval power of Athens. Conquest of Thessaly and the Theban invitation to take part in the Sacred War

¹ Cf. Dem., *Phil.* i, 6; ii, 19.

² Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 155 *et seq.*, 159 *et seq.*, pp. 191 *et seq.*, 206 *et seq.*

³ Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, 132.

secured him the first of these. Success made him head of the Amphictyonic Council, the great religious body of Greece, with tremendous prestige.¹ All his resources and all his ability were directed towards gaining the coast-land. Clever trickery and quick action won him important gains in the very beginning. Success attended him nearly to the end.

One Athenian saw the purposes of Philip and realized what threatened. Demosthenes, the orator, went before the people and declaimed against Philip. He showed them that Philip was a despot who desired universal empire and sought it without regard to peace or justice;² that he had the advantages of a despot in his ability to send his men whenever and wherever he willed, answerable to no one, publishing or concealing his designs as he chose; that he was unscrupulous in strategy and brutal in execution, plundering and pillaging, enslaving and murdering without mercy.³ The wealth and power of Athens, Demosthenes declared, was the king's ultimate objective; her democratic constitution, his most hated foe. "Democracies and despots cannot exist together." "Every king and despot is a foe to freedom."⁴ In democratic Athens leaders could not act save after deliberation by the people, and to the people they must report. Philip's speed and precision were impossible to them. Preparedness was the only means of safety: the creation and maintenance of a large fleet, and the training of a strong citizen army. Hasty levies of citizens, called to arms only at the approach of danger, would be of no avail against the skilled forces of Philip.⁵

¹ Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 288 *et seq.*

² Dem. *Phil.* ii, 7, 8.

³ *Id.*, *Ol.* i, 4, 25; *et seq.*

⁴ *Id.*, *Phil.* ii, 25; *Ol.* i, 5.

⁵ *Id.*, *Phil.* i, 4.

The situation in Thrace called for immediate attention. Demosthenes showed the nature of Philip's treachery there, and called on the people to avenge and protect their friends and allies.¹

Opposition immediately arose. Some asked, "What does all this signify? How is the state concerned in Philip's actions in Thrace?" To them he replied: "Religion and justice have the same obligation, be the subject of the offence great or small."² "But the war is far off and of no concern to Athens. Philip is friendly toward the city and would be on good terms with us." "Philip's character will not let him rest content. Already made great by Athenian neglect, he will soon be bringing the war to Attica. Protestations of friendship wrought the ruin of the Thracian cities, as they will of Athens if we are careless. The choice is between war yonder with an enemy discredited by deceit or war close by with a successful, and therefore more powerful enemy."³

Men, probably in the pay of Philip, attacked Demosthenes bitterly. They called him a soured water-drinker, declared that he was in the employ of Philip's opponents in other cities or else that Philip's offer to him had not been sufficiently high. They extolled the character and ability of Philip and claimed that it was useless for Athens to fight him. "Better to be on good terms with the coming leader of the Greeks." These men Demosthenes attacked as traitors who measure happiness by their belly and all that is base, while freedom and independence they count as nothing.⁴

¹ Demosthenes, *Ol. i*, *passim*.

² *Id.*, *Phil. iii*, 16.

³ *Id.*, *Ol. i*, 14, 15, 26.

⁴ Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, p. 280, Dem., *Phil. ii*, 30; *On the Crown*, 296; Aeschines, *On the Crown*, 81, 173.

Lovers of peace talked of the great prosperity of Athens, the abundant blessings of tranquility, and compared them with the breakdown of trade, the expense of maintaining large forces, the loss of men and money, and all the evils in the train of war.¹ They thought it better to suffer humiliations in Thrace than to risk all in war. Isocrates even appealed to Philip to be the leader of the Greeks, and held that his only opponents were those whose personal interests were challenged.² The rich objected to the expense and concealed their wealth, Demosthenes declared, to escape the burdens. The artisans in the city were willing to vote for war in the assembly, but were not willing to go themselves. Success or failure in the war meant little to them, while absence on service meant possibly loss of life, but surely ruin. Xenophon complained that they would not leave their benches though Attica itself were invaded. The farmer could not see beyond the confines of Attica. He was ever ready to fight in defence of his own fields, but was not interested in a war in far-off Thrace which did not appear to be his own.³ The peace party declared the whole dispute was due to the desire of a few men to plunder the public treasury.⁴ To such men Demosthenes could only show the reality of the danger, the menace of Philip's despotism to free Athens. He reminded them of the glories of past days, of the men who scorned to live if it could not be with freedom.⁵ He pointed the way to success :

¹ Dem., *On the Peace*, 24, 5. *On the Chersonese*, 8. *On the Embassy*, 88 *et seq.*

² Isocrates, *Philippus* 73 *et seq.*

³ Dem., *On the Naval Boards*, 25; Xen., *Econ.* vi, 5-8, *cf.* Pickard-Cambridge, *Public Orations of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1912), Introduction, p. 20.

⁴ Dem., *On the Chersonese*, 52.

⁵ *Id.*, *Ol.* iii, 28 *et seq.* *On the Chersonese* 40; *On the Crown*, 205 *et seq.*

If each of you can be relied upon to act when his duty bids him and when his services will be of use to his country; if he who has money will contribute and he who is of military age will enlist for the campaign.¹

Not her marketable commodities made Athens great and wealthy, but her freedom and power.²

The fire of the orator's eloquence aroused the people to momentary enthusiasm. They voted for war and for large expeditions, then failed to contribute money or to enlist. The time of the assembly was wasted in discussions over the conduct of the generals and the advisability of entrusting larger forces to them. As a result but small fleets and armies were dispatched, and these arrived too late.³ Demosthenes tried in vain to secure speed and service. "All words without action are vain and idle."⁴ "Voting alone will not save the state."⁵ He went throughout the Peloponnesian states in a hopeless attempt to form a league against Philip. The Greeks mistrusted Athens and would not follow her.⁶

Philip advanced with constant success until he reached the Bosphorus and threatened the Athenian food supply. Then Athens awoke. Alliances were made, fleets and armies dispatched, and Philip was driven back from under the walls of Byzantium.⁷ Athenian power alone blocked his path to empire. On a convenient pretext, he marched south into Greece. The words of Demosthenes had come true, the

¹ Dem., *Phil.* i, 7.

² *Id.*, *Phil.* iv, 50.

³ *Id.*, *Ol.* iii, 4.

⁴ *Id.* *Ol.* ii, 12; *Phil.*, ii, 3.

⁵ *Id.*, *On the Chersonese*, 77.

⁶ Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, p. 306.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 348, *et seq.*

war was coming home. The Athenians rallied. An alliance was secured with Thebes, the army was organized and sent forth to meet him. All was too late. The citizen levies of Athens and Thebes were no match for the trained armies of the Macedonian king. The battle of Chaeronea established Philip's power in Greece.¹ The character of Hellenic history was changed. The day of the city-state had passed.

The long series of wars and the many attempts to end them led to greater discussion of the question of peace and war by thinking men. Supporters of war like Xenophon and Demosthenes, the philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and orators like Lysias and Isocrates, all had something to say about the general problem.

Though Xenophon might admit that peace was a blessing and war a curse,² yet his experiences with the Ten Thousand and with Agesilaus in Asia had given him a martial fervor. He judged all things in the state by their relationship to war. Industry he condemned because it produced a class who were not warlike by nature but docile, unwilling to expend toil or to venture their lives in defence of the state.³ On the other hand, he called agriculture noble, because it trained body and soul for war, taught the lessons of co-operation and gave men a willingness to fight on behalf of their own lands.⁴ He condemned the coward and thought him a butt of ridicule.⁵ His ideal hero was a great general like Agesilaus as he conceived him to be, a leader good and brave, lofty of soul and large of judgment, a man of scientific knowledge in the business of war, a strong and stout commander, able to secure from his soldiers such obe-

¹ Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 359, *et seq.*

² Xen., *Hiero*, ii, 6.

³ *Id.*, *Econ.* vi, 5-8.

⁴ *Id.*, *Econ.* v, 6.

⁵ *Id.*, *Symp.* xi, 14.

dience and respect that they would follow him through fire and into the jaws of death and would achieve great deeds under his eyes.¹ Xenophon's symbol of order and efficiency was a well-organized army or a noble trireme, a splendid sight for friendly eyes, but a thing of terror to the enemy. But a disorganized force was the worst example of confusion and failure.² He knew from his own experience all the things that make war hard, the tasteless food, the restless slumber, the pains and the horrors of battle.³ But he had also tasted of the joys of victory, the rout of the enemy, the pursuit, the slaughter.

In what language shall I describe the exultation of these warriors at their feats of arms. With what assumption they bind on their brows the glittering wreath of glory; with what mirth and jollity they congratulate themselves on having raised their cities to newer heights of fame. Each citizen claims to have shared in the plan of campaign and to have slain the greatest number. Indeed it would be hard to find where false embellishment will not creep in, the number stated to be slain exceeding those that actually perished. So truly glorious a thing does it seem to them to have won so great a victory.⁴

For a man who had experienced such feelings war had lost most of its terrors. The method of prevention of war which appealed to him as best was preparedness. Though he recognized that a standing mercenary army would lead a neighboring state to desire peace, the best protection he felt was not a brilliant armor like that but the warlike aspect of the whole state.⁵

¹ Xen., *Econ.* xxi, 3-6; *Agésilas*, *passim*.

² *Id.*, *Econ.* vii, 4-6.

³ *Id.*, *Hiero* vi, 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii, 14 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, x, 7; xi, 3.

With the attitude of Xenophon, Demosthenes concurred. The only salvation he saw for Athens was a renewal of the ancient spirit and the creation of a strong, well-trained citizen army. But his efforts, as has been seen, were of no avail. He found his solution of the difficulties among the Greeks in a maintenance of the existing balance among the states; and to that end he strove to prevent any state from becoming strong enough to assume again a dominating position.¹

In the immediate problems of Hellas the philosophers were not particularly interested. In their discussions of politics, however, the general question of war came up for discussion.

In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon a few expressions of Socrates are recorded. Himself a soldier of Athens, he apparently felt the futility of war. When Glaucon urged upon him that the state might by going to war enrich itself out of the resources of its enemies, he rejoined that there was equal chance of defeat and the loss of valued possessions.² He called attention to the fact that preparedness was no guarantee of protection, that though men had built walls, collected armaments and secured allies, yet they had been attacked and had fallen victims to injustice.³

Plato regarded war as inevitable, a natural state, based on the struggle of country against country, village against village, family against family, and individual against individual, and of every man against himself.⁴ As such it was the product of civilization. Primitive man had not known

¹ Cf. Demosthenes, *For the Megalopolitans*.

² Xen., *Mem.* iii, 6, 8.

³ *Ibid.*, ii, 1, 4.

⁴ Plato, ed. Burnet, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1900-1907), trans. by Jowett, 5 vols. (3d ed. London, 1892), *Laws* 625 *et seq.* Cf. Shorey, "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought" in *Classical Philology* ix (1914), pp. 360 *et seq.*

wars, but when men had been compelled to live together they had learned the art of war as a part of the arts of government.¹ The causes of war, he said, were the same as the causes of all the other evils in the state: discontent, desire for money, for power, for expansion of territory at the cost of one's neighbor.² The basis for all these he found in injustice, which in turn was founded on that ignorance which led men to regard expediency as the best test, to disregard what they had agreed to observe, to hate the good and to embrace the evil.³ In view of this he felt that the guilt of war was confined to the few discontented persons who stirred up the evil.⁴ He condemned the search for power, the ambition for glory, the desire for plunder which led the rulers of the state to involve their people in war and to destroy cities and devastate lands.⁵ In the *Statesman*, Plato pointed out that those who were continually urging war from an excessive love of the military life, raised up enemies for the state and in the end either ruined it or enslaved it to its foes. On the other hand, he held that people who were too busy making money and quietly looking after their own affairs to take war in earnest, found ways too readily to keep the peace out of season, made their sons and their state unwarlike, and so lay at the mercy of their enemies and inevitably became slaves.⁶

Wars between Hellenes, the philosopher particularly deprecated. Since they were brothers and kinsmen, he called strife among them discord and disorder rather than war. The only justification which he admitted for it was

¹ Plato, *Laws* 678-9; *Protagoras* 322.

² *Id.*, *Republic* 351, 373, 4; *Alc.* i, 109, 112; *Euthyphro* 7; *Phaedo* 66 C.

³ *Id.*, *Alc.* i, 113; *Republic* 338; *Laws* 686-691.

⁴ *Id.*, *Republic*, 471 E, 575 B.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 544 *et seq.*

⁶ *Id.*, *Statesman* 307, 308.

the necessity of securing freedom. Then it should be so waged as to punish the guilty few and to lay as little burden as possible on the many innocent. Houses should not be burned nor crops carried off, nor Hellenic freemen be made slave. The whole affair should be waged with reconciliation in mind. The barbarians, however, he viewed as natural enemies on whom Hellenes should make war in the common interest of Hellas.¹

Plato believed thoroughly in preparedness as a distinct advantage, as well as a necessity for the individual and for the city. Every boy and every girl, he declared, should receive some training so that they might aid in defence of the city.² Not only was such training useful in time of necessity, but it developed the body and taught the noble lessons of valor and self-control.³ Even the ideal state required trained defenders. But they should be trained not only in those arts which taught courage and removed fear of death, but also in philosophy which embraced other virtues, that they might be like watch-dogs, gentle toward friends and fierce only toward enemies.⁴ In the *Laws* he showed that the Cretan and Spartan law-givers had erred in that they prepared their citizens only for war, forgetting that courage is but one of the virtues and that not the highest, that a man must be just and temperate and wise as well as courageous.⁵ Since he felt that only the perfectly just could ever attain the highest aim and be safe from injury from others, he advised for the average city preparation for war in times of peace.⁶ Hence it was that education and the arts

¹ Plato, *Republic*, 470 et seq.; *Menexenus* 239.

² *Id.*, *Laws*, 813, 4; *Republic* 422.

³ *Id.*, *Laches* 182; *Republic* 399; *Laws* 815, 6; *Protagoras* 359.

⁴ *Id.*, *Republic* 373 et seq.

⁵ *Id.*, *Laws* 630, 661, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 829.

of war and peace were to be in common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors should be kings.¹

In the last analysis Plato felt that war was to be waged for but one purpose, which was peace. "There neither is, has been, nor ever will be any amusement or instruction worth speaking of in war. Peace should be kept as long and as well as it can be."²

No one can be a true statesman whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or the state who looks only or first of all to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war and not war for the sake of peace. And is there not room for courage in peace as in war?³

With the views of Plato, Aristotle did not materially differ. He regarded self-interest as the greatest of the causes of war. The men who had brought on the wars which had so racked Hellas he declared had looked only to their own advantage and the interest of their own form of government and were not really concerned with the public interest at all.⁴ The desire to dominate over others he felt to be unlawful. "How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or legislator. Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice where there is might but no right."⁵ So he condemned the Spartan and Cretan statesmen who had framed their constitutions solely with a view to war, to conquer and to rule. Knowing no higher employment than war, their citizens knew not how to use peace. Like iron unused, they had rusted. They had not attained happiness and their empires had passed away.⁶

¹ Plato, *Republic* 543.

² *Id.*, *Laws* 803.

³ *Id.*, *Laws* 628; *Laches* 191.

⁴ Aristotle, ed. Acad. reg. boruss, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1831-70); *Politics*, trans. by Jowett, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1885), iv, 11, 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vii, 2, 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vii, 2, 18; 13.

Preparedness he supported thoroughly, both on the part of the ruler and the individual. It was the business of the leaders of the state, he held, to know not only its own power, capacity and history, but also the power and capacity of its neighbors and the results of wars elsewhere, that it might keep peace with the stronger and have the option of making war on the weaker.¹ He appreciated the advantages of the virtues of military life, the lessons of discipline and courage.²

Aristotle commended the business of war only as a means to the final end of peace.³ Those who brought on wars for selfish reasons or for the sake of war itself he called blood-thirsty villains.⁴ In peace only was a proper development of virtue possible.⁵ "The good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life and in the happiness which is attainable by them."⁶

The great champion of Hellenic peace was the rhetorician, Isocrates. He saw the dark side of the condition of Hellas, the endless wars, the wasting of lands, the enslavement of cities, the destruction of property, and the country full of exiles wandering and serving in armies for hire. Yet men saw fit to weep over the tales of calamity composed by the poets, and statesmen were so taken up with petty interests that they were not moved by the actual calamities of Greece.⁷ He saw peace treaties made which failed to settle the problem; eternal jealousies and hatreds which were never blotted out.

¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* i, 4, 9

² *Id.*, *Politics* vii, 15, 3; *Ethics* iii, 6, 7.

³ *Id.*, *Politics* vii, 13. *Ethics* 1177 b.

⁴ *Id.*, *Politics* v, 11, 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vii, 1, 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vii, 2, 16 *et seq.*

⁷ Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 167 *et seq.*, *Epist.* ix, 4, *Phil.* 2.

It is to no purpose that we make treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars but only defer them and wait for the time when we shall be able to inflict some irremediable injury on one another.¹

He therefore attacked the war party in Athens vigorously. When they spoke of recovering lost property, he pointed out that war had taken away safety and prosperity and even the necessities of life, and had destroyed the good repute of Athens. He drew a comparison between the Thessalians rich in fertile and extensive lands yet reduced to want by never-ending wars, and the Megarians who had little or nothing to start with and yet by keeping peace with all had become the wealthiest among the Hellenes.² He complained of the fact that, though the democracy had been overthrown in war, yet the people regarded the war party as the true democrats and the supporters of peace as oligarchs.³ He attacked the imperialistic treatment of the allies and the use of mercenary troops in defence of the empire.⁴ Victories such as the Spartans and the Thebans had gained contrary to right, with contempt for oaths and agreements, he regarded as more shameful and disgraceful than defeats suffered without cowardice. In the long run justice would prevail and right win over might.⁵ On the other hand, he declared that true prosperity was gained by peace founded on justice. For then followed freedom from wars, dangers and civil disturbances, increase in business, release from the burdens of war and the privilege of tilling the land, sailing the sea or engaging in any other occupation without fear.

¹ Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 172.

² *Id.*, *Peace* 6, 117.

³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴ *Id.*, *Areop.* 9; *Phil.* 96; *Paneg.* 185; *Peace* 47.

⁵ *Id.*, *Peace* 136; *Archidamus* 34.

Then merchants and aliens flocked to Athens and revenues and income increased abundantly.¹

In common with all Greek thinkers, Isocrates believed in defensive war and in wars against oppression on behalf of liberty.² He was proud of the record of Athens in this respect. "Not always is it to be considered glorious to fall in battle," he wrote Philip, "but it is worthy of praise when in defence of country, parents and children."³ When there was danger that Thebes might secure a union of the Greeks and accomplish the destruction of Sparta, he wrote a pamphlet purporting to be a speech of Archidamus, the purpose of which was to arouse the Spartans and probably to suggest that Athens would not consent to such a project.⁴ In this he qualified his pacific utterances by explaining that nothing was absolutely good or bad, and that war, though uncertain, might lead to prosperity as well as to loss.⁵ He called upon the Spartans to remember that it was in war that distinction and renown were won, and that it was better to exchange a perishable body for imperishable fame than to purchase a few more years of life with cowardice and disgrace.⁶ For such a war he believed that preparedness was necessary. For the individual he prescribed, "a good government, a life of self-control, and readiness to fight to the death against the foe."⁷ His advice for the state he summed up in a Golden Rule for nations. "Be warlike as concerns knowledge of war and preparations for it, but peaceful in committing no unjust aggression. Let your in-

¹ Isocrates, *Peace* 25; *Areop.* 51.

² *Id.*, *Paneg.* 75; *Panath.* 60.

³ *Id.*, *Epist.* ii, 4.

⁴ *Id.*, *Archidamus*; cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 450.

⁵ *Id.*, *Archidamus* 49.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 104, 107.

⁷ *Ibid.* 59.

tercourse with weaker states be such as you would require that of stronger states to be with you." ¹

The solution which Isocrates had to offer for the difficulties of Hellas he presented through speeches to be delivered at the great festivals. The value of these gatherings he appreciated, and he praised their founders for giving to the Greeks a custom which led them to assemble together as Hellenes, to lay aside quarrels and to make treaties of peace.² Gorgias and Lysias had both urged a union of the Greeks for a war upon Persia. This proposition Isocrates developed in 380 B. C. in the *Panegyricus*.³ The first essential of his scheme was a *symmachia*, an offensive alliance under a strong leader. Nominally he proposed a joint leadership of Athens and Sparta; actually the burden of the speech was the right of Athens to command and the unfitness of Sparta. It was probably a piece of propaganda to aid in making the second Athenian Confederacy an Hellenic League.⁴ He recalled the glorious past of Athens, showed how the Athenians had stood in the forefront of battle in the defence of Hellas. He brought back to mind the peace and prosperity of the period of Athenian rule in the preceding century and compared it with the great unhappiness caused by the Spartan empire. Idealizing the past, he painted what he hoped for the future. He acknowledged the wrongs done by Athens, but claimed that from her downfall as a result of them Athens had learned her lesson.

The first necessity that he laid down was a sound democratic government in Athens under the leadership of her best men, such a government as she had had in the days of the Persian wars. The leaders must then lay aside all jeal-

¹ Isocrates, *Ad Nicoclem* 24.

² *Id.*, *Paneg* 43.

³ Kessler, *Isokrates und die panhellenische Idee* (Berlin, 1911), p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 24 *et seq.*

ousy and greed and adopt a true Panhellenic policy in their administration of the state.¹ Furthermore, he called for righteous treatment of the allies, with no interference in their internal affairs by Athens except in defence of the democracy. Such a program he felt would bring all the Greeks willingly to the support of Athens. All the small states could count on protection from larger states, the sea would be freed from pirates and Hellas would be delivered from slavish homage to the Great King.²

The second essential of the alliance was a strong, binding purpose. This the orator found in the principle of the first Hellenic league war against Persia.³ Such a war he felt would be more like a sacred embassy than a campaign. It would bring peace at home for those who desired it; it would free the Asiatic Greeks from slavery; the homeless unfortunate would be given employment and a chance for a new start at the expense of the barbarians.⁴ Of the success of such an expedition there was no room for doubt, as the march of the Ten Thousand had shown.⁵

The plan was impossible of accomplishment, since Sparta entirely disregarded it. Agesilaus had made his own attempt at such an expedition and had not gained support. The second Athenian Confederacy was formed, and then failed because of the shortsightedness of the Athenian leaders. Still Isocrates did not despair. In the speech *On the Peace*, in 356, and in the *Areopagiticus*, in 355, he once again presented the same arguments. Reform of the administration of Athens, the laying-aside of that overweening ambition which had again caused her downfall, the strict enforcement

¹ Isocrates, *Panegyrikos* 76 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 104; *cf.* Kessler, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 *et seq.*

³ Isocrates, *Paneg.* 158.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

of the terms of peace, which had ended the Social War, the grant of independence to the allies, the discharge of all the mercenaries who had done so much to make Athens hated, the end of all cleruchies which plundered other states—these were the only things the orator felt that could restore Athens to her former high estate. Such reforms would be sufficient defence against Thebes, he argued, for then the other states would come flocking to the aid of Athens.¹ But Athenian democracy could not be reformed and the Greek states had learned to distrust Athens, as Demosthenes found out. Thus the glorious dream of Isocrates failed of realization.

Isocrates had not trusted to Athens alone but had looked afield for a leader wherever he might find one. He appealed without response to Jason of Pherae, to Dionysius of Syracuse and to Archidamus of Sparta.² In Philip of Macedon³ he saw, not as did Demosthenes the man who would rule, but the man who would lead the Greeks. Philip, he believed, was descended from the great Panhellenic hero, Heracles; he would not be involved in local quarrels or affected by jealousies, but would know all Hellas as his fatherland.⁴ So to him Isocrates in his old age turned. He called upon him to form a friendly alliance of all the Greeks, to organize a council in which the Greeks might deliberate under his presidency, and to lead them against Persia.⁵ He felt that the attacks upon Philip amounted to nothing. But they persisted and war followed. In the midst of this Isocrates issued his *Panathenaiscus*, a eulogy of the glorious past of his native city, perhaps to make clear to Philip what a city it was that he was

¹ Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, *passim*; *Peace* 19, 20, 44; 136-40; *et. al.*

² *Id.*, *Phil.* 119; *Epist.* i, ix.

³ *Id.*, *Phil.*; *Epist. ad Phil.*

⁴ *Id.*, *Phil.* 127.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

preparing to crush. Chaeronea was to him, not the death of Hellenic freedom, but the overthrow of a faction in Athens which made possible the consummation of his plan. Before the congress of Corinth met Isocrates had died. But that congress adopted his program: freedom and autonomy in all states with support of the democracy, peace and security at home, the end of wars, exiles and piracies, an alliance of the Greeks under Macedonian leadership and declaration of war on Persia.¹ Unfortunately for the Greeks it was a peace forced from without. Liberty and autonomy were but names and with peace came stagnation.

In the same year that Isocrates issued his speech on the peace an unknown writer wrote a treatise on the revenues of Athens.² It was an effort to show the Athenians how they might regain the wealth and power they had lost. He felt that the first essential was peace. Those states he said were the most fortune-favored which had peace in longest season. It was in times of peace that all men flocked to Athens—the mariner, the merchant, the wealthy dealer in corn and wine, the owner of many cattle, the banker, the artist, the artisan, the sophist, philosopher and poet and the pleasure-seeker, to add to the glory and wealth of the city. All the wealth that had been gained in times of peace was lavished in war, while the chief sources of revenue were themselves cut off. The method of prevention which the writer suggested was novel. Let the Athenians appoint a board to act as guardians of the peace, to settle disputes among the states, to see to it that Athens refrained from injustice and to harmonize warring states and warring factions in them; let the center of their endeavor be to preserve the independence of the Delphic shrine. Such a

¹ Kessler, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 *et seq.*; pp. 73 *et seq.*

² Xen., *Poroi* v. vi. This treatise is traditionally ascribed to Xenophon. On the date, cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (Leipzig, 1885), vol. i, p. 193.

scheme, backed up by the sending of embassies throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, could not fail, he thought, to bring the Greeks flocking to the support of Athens.¹

All these efforts to secure peace among the Hellenes during the fourth century failed, as arbitration had failed in the preceding century. Though the Olympic priests refused to receive as gifts trophies won from war between Hellenes,² religion was not strong enough to compass the end of such wars. Neither the arguments of the peace leaders nor the endeavors of the statesmen at the general conferences were of any avail. Occasional appeals to arbitration met with no response. Part of the answer to the question why may be found in the changed conditions of warfare. Though the development of trade and industry, the growth of individual appreciation of the finer things of life and of desire for ease and comfort, the general relaxation of the bonds by which the man was held to the state made peace seem more than ever desirable and the burdens of war more irksome and less to be borne, the nature of war itself had changed to meet these conditions. The surplus of population in the country districts of Arcadia and northwestern Greece and the great and increasing number of exiles furnished a body of men who were ready to remove the burden of individual service from the citizens for a price. The growth of mercenary armies led to specialization in warfare and the formation of a professional military class. They furnished at one time a constant war party and an outlet for the duties of war.³ The people could easily be stirred up to vote for a war in which they took little part. Since the mercenaries usually lived on the country in which they were fighting, the expense was less for the city which em-

¹ Xen., *Poroi* v.

² Cf. Xen., *Hell.* iii. 2, 21.

³ Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, pp. 101 *et seq.*

ployed them. These circumstances account for the difficulty which Demosthenes encountered when he tried to get the Athenians to take part in the war with Philip and for the ease with which Philip won that war.

The many conferences failed, the principles of freedom and autonomy were of no avail, because the position of weaker states was not permanently established with an organization for their protection. The very guarantor of their position was their most dangerous enemy. Accordingly they were forced into the arms of one or another of the more powerful states and their independence was lost. The same conditions prevailed with regard to the agreements to enforce peace. When the enforcement was left to the great states it opened tempting paths to self-aggrandizement; when left to several or all the states without compulsion, old jealousies and fears intervened and wars followed on the general line of previous divisions. Any state strong enough and covetous enough might break the peace with assurances of support, and hence comparative impunity. The only suggestion to establish a central organism was disregarded as foolish.

In all of their agreements the Greeks failed because they did not face and settle the basic problems of interstate relations. No real effort was made to bridge the gap of distrust and misunderstanding between Athenian democracy and Spartan oligarchy. None of the states was willing to accept the diminution of pride and power necessary to establish a lasting compromise. Athens was never willing to give up her claims to power; Sparta felt that she could not part with her military system; Thebes would not surrender her hopes for the hegemony of Greece. Whenever a settlement was near, some element of jealousy or of hatred, some fear of undue influence or interference, some unwillingness to yield the least jot, lest pride and prestige be injured, came up to wreck all hopes of lasting peace.

